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Abstract: This paper engages the concept of transnational law (TL) in a way
that goes beyond the by now accustomed usages with regard to the
development of legal norms and the observation of legal action across
nation-state boundaries, involving both state and nonstate actors. The
concept of TL can serve to illustrate a much further-reaching set of
developments in norm creation and legal regulation. TL is here understood
not only as a body of legal norms, but it is also employed as a
methodological approach to illustrate common and shared challenges and
responses to legal regulatory systems worldwide. In the case of corporate
governance, TL captures the specific regulatory mix of formal, hard, public
regulation, on the one hand and of informal, soft, private regulation, on the
other, that characterizes the contemporary evolution of corporate governance
norms. Corporate governance norms give testimony of an ongoing search for
answers to persisting problems in the organization of the firm, the
distribution of power between shareholders, stakeholders, and the firm, as
well as the responsibility of the corporation to its environment while—at the
same time—reflecting on fundamental changes of the nature of norm
creation and legal interpretation. While this approach is likely already to
undermine some of the contentions regarding a universal convergence of
corporate governance systems towards an outsider-control, shareholdervalue-maximization model at the “end of history of corporate law,” its risks
lie in the misappropriation of the described processes of private ordering as
processes of natural evolution. After all, the shift away from formal law
making to processes of societal self-regulation—as reflected in the rise of
corporate governance codes, standards, best practices or, in the area of labor
law, of codes of conduct and core labor rights—might turn out to be a less
fortunate answer to the redistributive and participatory questions that are
posed when one views corporate governance in the context of a larger set of
welfare state norms, comprising not only company law and securities
regulation, but also labor and employment law, industrial relations, and
insolvency law. Eventually, a careful study of the transformation of the
process of law making and rule enforcement suggests the necessity of taking
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a broader view on corporate governance than is often the case. Seen against
the background of a globalization of economic activity, capital flows, and the
erosion of many protective norms and rights—in particular in the area of
labor law—the study of transnational corporate governance can contribute to
a better understanding of the regulatory challenges of a globalized market
economy.
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THE PARALLEL WORLDS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND LABOR LAW
Peer Zumbansen
INTRODUCTION
The transterritorialization of company activities that span the globe—
with widespread subsidiaries, interfirm networks, and extreme forms of
outsourcing of formerly corporate-owned processes—challenges traditional
regulatory aspirations of nation-states and other political bodies.1 Corporate
activity is disintegrated into a multitude of decentralized, and yet connected,
processes. This state reflects on the dramatic changes of the nature and
structure of the private business corporation and of the marketplace in which
it operates. With corporate activity encompassing the production of cars,
tank ships, microchips, medical and spaceflight software, precision weapons,
and throw-away toys to help uninventive hosts of children’s birthday parties,
no end is in sight to a feverishly progressing diversification of products and
methods for their branding, assembly, and dissemination.2 Dell, the computer
firm, made use of the “three new freedoms” in the 1990s—to conduct
business without borders, to conduct business “unburdened by any sense of
responsibility to any community or any individual,” and to conduct it in the
wake of a technological revolution that allowed for an unprecedented
extension of the assembly line3—exemplifying a much larger trend, whose
sources and driving forces date to at least a century prior. The “Dell Effect”
describes a computer manufacturing and sales unit that can custom assemble

1.

Peter Hertner, Corporate Governance and Multinational Enterprise in Historical
Perspective, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND
EMERGING RESEARCH 41 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998); see Mark Herkenrath & Volker
Bornschier, Transnational Corporations in World Development: Still the Same Harmful
Effects in an Increasingly Globalized World Economy?, 9 J. WORLD-SYSTEMS RES. 105
(2003).
2.

See generally NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES (1st
Picador USA ed. 2001) (1999).
3.

BARRY C. LYNN, END OF THE LINE: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GLOBAL CORPORATION
103 (2005).
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and deliver computers anytime and anywhere in the world,4 that has
dramatically cut down on inventory times and, much like Walmart,
integrated its thousands of business partners, suppliers, assemblers, and
transporters in a worldwide logistical web. It must today be seen to embody
much of what Manuel Castells rightly coined the “Network Society,”5 and
what others refer to as the “Digital Revolution.”6 The stories are no less than
breathtaking:
As other companies struggled to reorganize their internal
operations, to contract out more work, to blend in more
overseas sources of supply, [Michael] Dell focused on using
the latest in supply-chain management software to coordinate
the movement of components from wherever he could get
them. Almost entirely unrestrained by existing in-house
component-manufacturing operations, Dell concentrated
instead on developing a system that could track individual
items—no matter where they were made—more tightly and
efficiently than was possible even in the most perfectly
integrated of old-line companies. For Dell, manufacturing was
not making things, it was buying and moving and assembling
and delivering things that other companies had
manufactured.7
Michael Piore and Charles Sabel have identified the enormous social,
economic, and political consequences of Taylorist scientific production

4.

See DELL INC., THE DELL EFFECT: EXPANDING ACCESS AND CHANGING THE WORLD 1–2
http://www.dell.com/downloads/global/corporate/delleffect/DellEffect.pdf; Dell Global
Product Development, http://www1.us.dell.com/content/topics/global.aspx/innovation/en/cto
_product_development?c=us&l=en&s=corp (detailing Dell’s innovation centers in Texas,
India, China, Taiwan, and Malaysia).
5.

MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE: THE
RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY (2d ed. 2000).
6.

JACK CHALLONER, THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION (2002).

7.

LYNN, supra note 3, at 102.
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forms, 8 standardization of work tasks, and the construction of markets for
mass consumer goods through the technological revolution in the nineteenth
century as the “Second Industrial Divide.”9 These phenomena seem mere
precursors to present developments, the impact of which we recognize as still
more radical and untamable than the former. While the welfare state arose10
out of the dire situation of rural desertion, urban poverty, and industrial
workers’ hardship,11 no such utopian model offers itself at the outset of the
twenty-first century. With the Western welfare state struggling to rediscover
its institutional promise for the future,12 the answers to the regulatory
challenges of globalized markets are increasingly sought elsewhere.
In this new globally competitive economy, the exploited
human beings with whose dignity and welfare the founders of
labour laws were concerned, are now most likely to be found
in sweat shops in South Asia or the Caribbean producing
clothes for supermarkets in Europe and America; or in slum
factories in East Asia assembling circuit boards for
transnational IT companies.13

8.

See MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE:
POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 45–46 (1984). The term Taylorism goes back to the
particular form of mass production conceptualized in FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE
PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911).
9.

PIORE & SABEL, supra note 8, at 6.

10.

See Paul Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare State, 48 WORLD POL. 143 (1996);
Philip Manow, Welfare State Building and Coordinated Capitalism in Japan and Germany,
in THE ORIGINS OF NONLIBERAL CAPITALISM 94, 95 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kozo Yamamura
eds., 2001).
11.

See generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2d ed., Beacon Press 2001) (1944); UPTON SINCLAIR,
THE JUNGLE (Random House 2002) (1906) (providing an account of the bleak and violent
conditions of workers in Chicago’s stockyards in novel form).
12.

See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the
Exhaustion of Utopian Energies, in THE NEW CONSERVATISM: CULTURAL CRITICISM AND
THE HISTORIANS’ DEBATE 48, 50–51, 54, 59 (Shierry Weber Nicholsen ed. and trans., 1989).
13.

BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 5–6 (2005).
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The characterization of economic globalization as the worldwide
interaction of global trading partners is paralleled by an unprecedented
economic interdependence of industry branches and their respective human
and institutional communities and stakeholders around the world. This
interdependence results from firms relying on the cheapest labor, on exportprocessing zones, and on just-in-time delivery of elements from innumerable
places and directions.14 This highly sensitive system of interlocking
production and delivery processes constitutes an overwhelming challenge for
traditional conceptions of business corporations, of their relations to business
partners, and of stakeholders, such as employees and the community in
which a business operates. Underneath the shining layer of universally
available standard goods, unrestrained by seasonal changes or other local
conditions, we find a pulsating network of fine arteries connecting a
multitude of actors’ lives, each delivered to this massive and sprawling
machinery. The “state as machine”15 has seemingly found its master.
The focus of this paper is on the changes in legal regulation of
transnational corporate activity. The study of the structure of contemporary
legal regulation is rendered difficult through the proliferation of “spaces and
places” of norm generation.16 As a result, an exploration of the law
applicable to domestic and global corporate activity must trespass
disciplinary boundaries, as the norms that corporations follow (or seek to
escape) encompass corporate law rules, the rules of taxation law and labor
law, which together shape the regulatory environment of the contemporary
corporation. But, such exploration must also illuminate the tension between
the place of the business operation and the locally applied norms (“place”),

14.

See id. at 13–14.

15.

HORST DREIER, HIERARCHISCHE VERWALTUNG IM DEMOKRATISCHEN STAAT 19–36
(1991).
16.

See generally SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: ESSAYS ON THE
NEW MOBILITY OF PEOPLE AND MONEY (1998). Cf. J. Rogers Hollingsworth, New
Perspectives on the Spatial Dimensions of Economic Coordination: Tensions Between
Globalization and Social Systems of Production, 5 REV. OF INT'L POL. ECON. 482, 487
(1998). See also Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered
State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 401, 403–04, 426 (2001); Peer Zumbansen, Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory
Approach to Regulatory Competition in European Company Law, 12 EUR. L. J.
(forthcoming 2006).
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and the decentered reality of the corporation and the norms that are emerging
to address this delocalized phenomenon of corporate activity (“space”).
While the political economy of domestic corporate and labor regulation is
still characterized by contested traditions of institutional and political
heritage and disciplinary boundaries and power,17 the regulatory
environment of corporations and laborers operating on and for global
markets increasingly incorporates distinctly transnational elements. States or
international organizations are not the sole authors of laws and binding
norms.18 Domestic statutory and case law (especially in the field of labor
law) is complemented by a proliferation of “soft law,” corporate governance
codes, codes of conduct, best practice guidelines, and standards. Meanwhile,
domestic labor law programs and international labor law face the challenge
and competition of transnational labor norms, generated by both public and
private norm authors that operate with little regard to political and
geographical borders.19 This proliferation and hybridization of norms in the
areas of labor law and corporate law raises multiple questions as to the legal
nature of these norms, their authorship, and their enforceability. In a brilliant
analysis of this challenge, Adelle Blackett wrote in the Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies a few years ago:
Workers in EPZs [export processing zones] are thrust into the
post-modern system of just-in-time flexible accumulation as

17.

See generally Kathleen Thelen, Varieties of Labor Politics in the Developed Democracies,
in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 71 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
18.

Niklas Luhmann, Die Weltgesellschaft, 57 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE
[ARSP] 1 (1971) (F.R.G.); See Gunther Teubner, Review Essay, Breaking Frames: The
Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 149, 149–50 (1997); Peer
Zumbansen, Die vergangene Zukunft des Völkerrechts, 34 Kritische Justiz [KJ] 46 (2001)
(F.R.G.) (identifying the absence of a hierarchy of norms in the global sphere).
19.

See HEPPLE, supra note 13, at 69–87. See generally the discussion between Philip Alston
and Brian Langille on the viability of the ILO regime and the merits of core labor rights and
standards: Philip Alston, ‘Core Labour Standards’ and the Transformation of the
International Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 457 (2004) [hereinafter Alston,
Core Labour Standards]; Brian A. Langille, Core Labour Rights – The True Story (Reply to
Alston), 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 409 (2005); Philip Alston, Facing up to the Complexities of the
ILO’s Core Labour Standards Agenda, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 467 (2005) [hereinafter Alston,
Facing up].
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they enter the deterritorialized legal order of the multinational
enterprises, living and producing their norms. Yet, they do so
in particular places that may harken back to the Dickensian
conditions of nineteenth-century industrialization.20
Underscoring the importance of an astute analysis of the place of
regulation against the background of the larger dimensions of economic and
regulatory spaces to open up the local framework, she notes later:
[B]y explicitly considering the importance of place, corporate
codes can broaden the discussion of labor rights to address the
frequent inability of developing countries and transition
economies to provide functional labor inspection and dispute
resolution services, not to mention suitable schools.21
The need for such inquiry seems obvious given the evidence of the
detrimental effect of deregulated labor markets on workers’ conditions,
employment hours and protection, wage levels, and training.22 In light of the
current state of labor law regulation on the domestic and international level,
attention has increasingly turned to transnational norms of labor regulation.23
But, skepticism rightly prevails regarding the quality of self-regulatory
regimes as embodied in corporate codes of conduct or core labor standards.24
This calls for a comprehensive study and exploration of the conditions
that shape contemporary employment—within domestic markets as well as
in developing countries and crucially delegalized export processing zones.

20.

Blackett, supra note 16, at 405.

21.

Id. at 431.

22.

HEPPLE, supra note 13, at 17. Contra MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS 220–
48 (2004).
23.

ROGER BLANPAIN & MICHELE COLUCCI, THE GLOBALIZATION OF LABOUR STANDARDS:
THE SOFT LAW TRACK (2004); JILL MURRAY, CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT AND
LABOUR STANDARDS, http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/guide/jill.htm
(last visited Jan. 13, 2006).
24.

HEPPLE, supra note 13, at 11 (“Behind the paper tigers of laws and codes of conduct, is
the thriving jungle of the market.”). “Private corporate codes exist because of the absence of
an enforceable internationally agreed labour regime.” Id. at 72.
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Whether or not a transnational labor regime will deliver in the hopes for a
better and more effective protection of the rights of workers in today’s global
economy depends to a large degree on its concrete legal structure. It seems
evident that the transnationalization of labor law bears many commonalities
with the global reach of corporate governance norms, in particular with
regard to the hybridization of the applicable rules into an intricate mixture of
hard and soft law, of statutory norms, and of self-regulatory regimes. At the
same time, the concerns of labor lawyers will continue to differ dramatically
from those of today’s corporate lawyers and corporate law scholars. The dire
reality of contemporary labor law, embedded in a seemingly universal loss of
terrain for both political leverage and scholarly influence, testifies to the
field’s state of siege. As Douglas Branson remarked,
Worker exploitation, degradation of the environment,
economic imperialism, regulatory arbitrage, and plantation
production efforts by the growing stable of gargantuan
multinationals, whose power exceeds that of most nation
states, is far higher on the global agenda than is convergence
in governance.25
It is against these regimes’ different prospects for the future that the
inquiry into the transnationalization of corporate and labor norms needs to be
conceptualized. Hence, the study of what might be understood as an
emerging transnational law of corporate governance has to focus on the
various existing regulatory frameworks for business corporations on the
domestic, transnational, and international level. Conceptualizing the norms
that shape the “constitution of the firm” as a transnationally evolving body of
law26 helps to illuminate the embeddedness of firms in layers of rules.27

25.

Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in
Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321, 326 (2001).
26.
27.

See CHRISTINE A. MALLIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ch. 3 (2004).

See generally ANDREW SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER (1965); Robert Boyer & J. Rogers Hollingsworth, From
National Embeddedness to Spatial and Institutional Nestedness, in CONTEMPORARY
CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 433 (J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert
Boyer eds., 1997); Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem
of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481 (1985); Peer Zumbansen, The Privatization of
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Business corporations and the norms that govern them must be understood in
the context of their origin and development in specific systems of
production28 as well as in legal and socioeconomic cultures.29 The
transnational law of corporate governance encompasses the hard law that
governs the corporation through domestic company law, securities
regulation, tax law, or labor law, on the one hand, and the soft law of
voluntary codes of conduct, corporate governance codes, human rights
codes, and core labor standards, on the other.
As the latter present a dramatic challenge to traditional understandings of
law making, an analysis of voluntary codes of conduct further illuminates the
complex nature of the regulated and self-regulating firm. But the inquiry into
the transnationalization of corporate and labor norms reveals a much less
natural or unavoidable development than is often thought. Instead of
understanding the new politics of labor as illuminating and assessing an
inevitable development, quasi-naturally accompanying the globalization of
commercial activity, this process must be studied with much closer attention
to the political constellations in which choices are made.30 The move of legal
analysis beyond the confines of the nation-state must incorporate the lessons
learned from previous studies of regulatory change in domestic welfare-state

Corporate Law?: Corporate Governance Codes and Commercial Self-Regulation,
JURIDIKUM (F.R.G.), Mar. 2002, at 32.
28.

See SANFORD M. JACOBY, THE EMBEDDED CORPORATION: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES (2005); MICHAEL
STORPER & ROBERT SALAIS, WORLDS OF PRODUCTION: THE ACTION FRAMEWORKS OF THE
ECONOMY (1997).
29.

See generally Richard Whitley, The Social Construction of Economic Actors:
Institutions and Types of Firms in Europe and Other Market Economies, in THE CHANGING
EUROPEAN FIRM 39 (Richard Whitley & Peer Hull Kristensen eds., 1996); RICHARD
WHITLEY, DIVERGENT CAPITALISMS (2d ed. 2000); Robert Boyer, Hybridization and Models
of Production: Geography, History, and Theory, in BETWEEN IMITATION AND INNOVATION
23 (Robert Boyer et al. eds., 1998); SYSTEMS OF PRODUCTION: MARKETS, ORGANISATIONS
AND PERFORMANCE (Brendan Burchell et al. eds., 2003). See also MARK J. ROE, STRONG
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994).
30.

See Karl Klare, The Horizons of Transformative Labour and Employment Law, in
LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 3 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002); Joanne
Conaghan, Women, Work, and Family: A British Revolution?, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION, supra, at 53.
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regimes, in order to ask the right questions when confronted with the
plethora of self-regulatory norms, codes of best practice, codes of conduct,
and core standards. In addition, the comparative view on both corporate and
labor law shall allow bridging some of the bifurcations that characterize the
commonly separated fields of law. While, in labor law, a distinct critique of
self-regulation and an erosion of enforceable rights have been unfolding over
the past few years,31 the same cannot be said of contemporary mainstream
scholarship in the area of corporate law. Here, the discourse seems to be
predominantly determined by ongoing concerns with issues of “ownership
and control” and an alleged convergence of corporate governance rules
toward a shareholder-value maximization model.32 After important studies
exploring the political economy of the corporation,33 the focus on the lawmaking aspects of corporate norms is much more recent.34 Only from this
perspective can we arrive at a more precise and adequate picture of the role
of law in shaping the constitution of the firm. Deciphering this role is
important in view of the manifold functions that today’s firms perform on the
domestic and the transnational level. These functions of the firm include: the
furthering of prosperity for shareholders and stakeholders such as employees,

31.

See H.W. Arthurs, Labour Law without the State?, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1996);
Manfred Weiss, The Future of Comparative Labor Law as an Academic Discipline and as a
Practical Tool, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 169 (2003); Alston, Core Labour Standards,
supra note 19; Philip Alston, Labour Rights as Human Rights: The Not So Happy State of
the Art, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Philip Alston ed., 2005); Simon Deakin,
Social Rights in a Globalized Economy, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 25.
But see Langille, supra note 19.
32.

See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (subsequently republished in different collections). For an
early, quite vehement critique of the Hansmann & Kraakman article, see Branson, supra
note 25, at 330–31 (calling it a “chauvinistic statement of the Americanocentric convergence
thesis.”).
33.

Walther Rathenau, Vom Aktienwesen (1917); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The 20th Century
Capitalist Revolution (1954); Shonfield, supra note 27.
34.

Theodor Baums, Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a Law Making
Process of a Very New Nature—Interview with Professor Dr. Theodor Baums, GERMAN
L.J., July 16, 2001, http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=43; John W.
Cioffi, Governing Globalization? The State, Law, and Structural Change in Corporate
Governance, 27 J.L. & SOC'Y 572 (2000); Zumbansen, supra note 27.
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creditors, and the community at large; guaranteeing employee pension
plans;35 investing in research and development; and disseminating resulting
knowledge, as well as engaging in the protection of the environment or
observing cultural requirements and human rights standards in the firm’s
operation in various political contexts. In addition, as firms offer themselves
as prime agents of technological innovation, their role within regional and
national economies is of utmost importance under conditions of global
competition. Noting a recently heightened awareness among policy makers
in Canada, the United States, and the European Union of the need to
strengthen the innovative potential of their economies, it is mandatory to
better understand the role of business corporations and the potential for, but
also the shortcomings of, regulatory approaches in this respect.36
The first Part of this article explores the different genealogies and
trajectories of corporate law and labor law as the two great, opposed building
blocks of the “political economy of the firm.”37 In the context of this article,
the focus in Part II.A. will be on the different regulatory foci of corporate
and labor law and their respective images and concepts of the corporation, its
stakeholders, and its role in society. This first comparison of the different
worlds of corporate and labor law serves as a prerequisite for the closer

35.

See Donald J. Johnston, Foreword to ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD
Principles of Corporate Governance 3–4 (rev. ed. 2004),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf (“In today’s economies, interest in
corporate governance goes beyond that of shareholders in the performance of individual
companies. As companies play a pivotal role in our economies and we rely increasingly on
private sector institutions to manage personal savings and secure retirement incomes, good
corporate governance is important to broad and growing segments of the population.”).
36.

ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note 35, at 13–14 (“The Principles are
evolutionary in nature and should be reviewed in light of significant changes in
circumstances. To remain competitive in a changing world, corporations must innovate and
adapt their corporate governance practices so that they can meet new demands and grasp
new opportunities. Similarly, governments have an important responsibility for shaping an
effective regulatory framework that provides for sufficient flexibility to allow markets to
function effectively and to respond to expectations of shareholders and other stakeholders.”).
37.

See generally THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY (J.E. Parkinson et al. eds.,
2000). The inquiry into the no less important political economy of taxation law in shaping
the regulatory environment of the firm will be pursued in a subsequent paper. See, e.g., Neil
Brooks, The Logics, Policy and Politics of Tax Law, in MATERIALS ON CANADIAN INCOME
TAX LAW (Tim Edgar et al. eds., 12th ed., Carswell 2000).
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scrutiny of the changes in regulatory method that have been taking place in
both fields. The changes in corporate law, through the comparative study and
impact of foreign corporate governance rules and through the issuance of
corporate governance recommendations and standards through private and
quasi-public bodies on the domestic and international level, have nurtured
belief in a universal convergence of corporate governance rules. And yet,
contestations remain strong. This is the focus of Part II.B. of this article. The
last Part explores the larger context of a turn to standards, recommendations,
and corporate self-regulation against the background of international law’s
long-standing soul-searching.38 We enter ardent debates over the viability of
legal regulatory frameworks in an increasingly globalized society.39 Whether
it is possible to transport and translate our understanding and experiences of
the rule of law and “fora, forms and processes” of legal deliberation40 into
the realms of disintegrated social activity goes to the heart of our reliance on
law as a means of social regulation. But, instead of suggesting that the turn to
codes of conduct be read as the swan song of the rule of law, the concluding
part highlights the stakes of corporate self-regulation and the rise of labor
standards in light of the fragility of rights and enforcement procedures in a
complex and fragmented global society.

38.

On the ongoing introspection among international lawyers on their field, see Manley O.
Hudson, The Prospect for International Law in the Twentieth Century, 10 CORNELL L.Q.
419 (1925); see also Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition
and Renewal, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 113 (2005).
39.

See the breathtaking concluding chapter in NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL
SYSTEM (Ziegert Fatima Kastner et al. eds., Klaus A. Ziegert trans., 2004). See also
Luhmann, supra note 18. More recently in this context, see Andreas Fischer-Lescano &
Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation
of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999, 1003 (2004) (“Neither doctrinal formulas of legal
unity, nor the theoretical ideal of a norm hierarchy, nor the institutionalization of
jurisdictional hierarchy provide an adequate means to avoid such conflicts.”). On the theme
of a non-hierarchical, global legal order, see Peer Zumbansen, Beyond Territoriality: The
Case of Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Constitutionalism Web-Papers, ConWEB
No. 4/2005), available at
http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudiesandPhilosophy/FileStore/
ConWEBFiles/Filetoupload,16448,en.pdf . On Luhmann’s concept of law as a globalizing
social system, see Peer Zumbansen, Notes on the Fragility of Law: A Review Essay on
Niklas Luhmann's Law as a Social System, 17 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2006).
40.

Rudolf Wiethölter, Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law, in
DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 221 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986).
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I. STUDYING CORPORATIONS, THEIR STAKEHOLDERS, AND THEIR LAW
Corporate law and labor law inhabit two distinct and separate worlds of
legal thought—and of political reality. Corporate governance codes and
corporate codes of conduct endorsing labor norms41 mirror the existing
tension inherent to different groups in the legal and economic fields. Both
groups of actors are protagonists in different narratives describing the reality
of globally integrated markets and the new economy. In one narrative, we
find contract and property considerations turning on management control.
For corporate law, its primary regulatory focus is on shareholder value. With
regard to the regulatory context, corporate law is embedded within a larger
programmatic frame where structural considerations regarding the business
corporation—“legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares,
delegated management . . . and investor ownership”42—are perceived to be
akin to policies focusing on investor protection, financial stability, and “good
governance.”43
In contrast, the labor law narrative illustrates an increasingly endangered
range of rights for workers and the need to adapt the applicable legal regime
to the economic realities that have come upon us.44 As the economic
environment continues to change dramatically, allowing for a radical
flexibility of capital and work, workers are threatened by the loss of many of
their institutional and regulatory safeguards. Attempts to reinvigorate labor
rights and worker protection are hampered by international pressure to
provide attractive economic environments. Where rights for workers are
demanded by developing countries, these nations fear yet another
protectionist backlash from developed states.

41.

See the excellent introduction on the ILO’s website. Corporate Codes of Conduct,
http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/code/main.htm (last visited Jan. 13,
2006).
42.

Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What Is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW 1 (2004).
43.

See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR
MARKETS 55–74 (2002), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/fulltext/ch3.pdf;
Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the
Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 199 (2004).
44.

See the debate between Alston and Langille: Alston, Core Labour Standards, supra note
19; Langille, supra note 19; Alston, Facing up, supra note 19.
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It can be shown, however, that these narratives actually do not describe
separate worlds but are instead two sides of the same coin. Both tell the story
of powerful changes in societal governance through law. Beyond the
conflation of different “models of democracy,”45 there exists a crucial
parallel between the regulatory challenges faced by public actors, such as
states and international bodies and the ever-growing freedoms of
transnationally operating corporations. The transformations in governance
brought about by the denationalization of societal activity,46 by technological
advances, and by an irreversible interpenetration of public and private sites
of power and identity,47 are reproducing themselves in our debates over
substance (What is the corporation? Whose firm is it?) and procedure (How
do norms come about? Are codes law?). Central to both narratives are
changes in their respective legal regime. But, while these legal
transformations can be understood as reacting to similar challenges—the
difficulty of extending nation-states’ regulatory reach to foreign operating
business organizations, a proliferation of norm-making actors and levels, and
a complex coexistence of hard law and soft law48—there remains a great
need to further explore these transformations of legal regulation. While labor
law now needs to find its institutional and normative holding in globally
integrated markets and a drastically changed regulatory environment,
corporate governance seems to reflect the bright side of the recent new

45.

David Held, Models of Democracy (2d ed. 1997); Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy
(2000); Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in The Inclusion of the
Other 239 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998).
46.

See generally Luhmann, supra note 18; LUHMANN, supra note 39; Saskia Sassen,
Globalization or Denationalization?, 10 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 1 (2003).
47.

Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & SOC'Y REV. 719 (1973); Sally Engle Merry,
Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes, 21 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 357
(1992); Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); Peer Zumbansen,
Transnational Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Jan Smits ed., forthcoming
2006).
48.

See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law,
Globalization, and Emancipation (2002). In this vein, see Jean-Philippe Robé, Multinational
Enterprises: The Constitution of a Pluralistic Legal Order, in Global Law Without a State,
supra note 47, at 45, 55.
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economy—here, everyone drives a BMW and concludes business deals over
the Internet. The perceived changes in norm production in corporate
governance evoke an apparently altogether different and dissociated
discourse on the chances and dynamics of global markets from the narrative
of the rise and fall of labor law.
In order to further illustrate the tension between the worlds of corporate
governance and labor law, I will sketch some significant elements of the
political economy of both fields and disciplines. Against this background,
then, we can discern fundamental problems of analogizing the rise of quasiuniversal corporate governance concepts (such as shareholder-value
maximization) with the emergence of corporate codes of conduct and core
labor standards. While the former are representative of a far-reaching
transformation of the rules pertaining to business organization in order to
make business management more responsive to investor needs, the
development of labor standards that depend on their recognition by states
and private corporate actors and of corporate codes of conduct that remain
enforceable only on a voluntary basis, reflects on the increasingly fragile
standing of labor law in the global regulation of the economy. The claim to
fame of the corporate governance movement at the beginning of the twentyfirst century might be the flipside of the longstanding deterioration of labor
rights and an effective labor rights regime.
A. Exploring the Geography of the “Worlds” of Corporate Governance and
Labor Law
1. Regulatory Framework
a. Corporate Governance
With regard to the policy program of corporate governance, we find an
eternal struggle with the separation of “ownership and control.” This is not a
new topic,49 but is one that has been powerfully exacerbated by the recent

49.

See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1968).
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financial scandals in the United States and elsewhere.50 The problem of the
separation of ownership and control boils down to more specific inquiries
into corporate personality and limited liability,51 managerial power, and
minority protection.52 In light of related discussions, we can discern the
“purpose” of the corporation to be the generation of profit for shareholders.53
Control has always been a contested concept, invoking countervailing
conceptual approaches; control ought to be exercised either through internal
organization or the market, inner-firm instruments of management
supervision with or without independent directors, or takeovers.54 While the
latter clearly points to the embeddedness of corporate law in a wider frame
of regulatory politics and path-dependent corporate trajectories,55 a
microanalysis of corporate law remains restricted to an inside view of the
corporation. Corporate law remains confined to the “ownership and control”
model that is exclusively oriented around financial ownership. Human
capital investment, in contrast,56 is not considered on the same level as

50.

See generally Margaret M. Blair, Post-Enron Reflections on Comparative Corporate
Governance, 14 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 113 (2003); Lyman Johnson, After Enron:
Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (2003).
51.

See the brilliant analysis by Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The
Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J.
COMP. L. 583 (1999). For a historical background and critique, see Paddy Ireland,
Capitalism Without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock Company Share and the Emergence of
the Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality, 17 J. LEGAL HIST. 41 (1996).
52.

See generally A.J. BOYLE, MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS’ REMEDIES (2002).

53.

William Lazonick & Mary O'Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology
for Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY 11
(William Lazonick & Mary O'Sullivan eds., 2002).
54.

See Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the
European Corporate Governance Environment, in EUROPEAN TAKEOVERS: LAW AND
PRACTICE 49 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1992).
55.

Mark J. Roe, Path Dependence, Political Options, and Governance Systems, in
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS 165, 167–68 (Klaus J.
Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1997); see also Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate
Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993).
56.

See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995).
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financial investment. Eventually, the combination of financial transparency
goals promoted and enforced by the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC), and the protection of managerial prerogatives, led to a forceful
exclusion of employees from the American concept of corporate
governance.57 Hence, all protective policies relating to investment regularly
address the protection of the investor.
With corporate law’s mandate being driven and constantly refined by
policy makers, regulators, and scholars, as well as leaders of business and
industry associations, large corporations, public policy institutions, and
regulatory bodies such as securities commissions, government commissions,
and expert teams, as well as international financial institutions that promote
goals of “good governance,” the primary focus remains on the improvement
of corporate disclosure and of more effective firm management.58
A final observation on the regulatory program of corporate governance is
related to the world of corporate law scholarship and teaching.59 Corporate
law as it is presented in textbooks and classrooms will usually exclude labor
law, and hence, the employee. This, however, is owed less to an overriding
sense of autonomy or even superiority as regards other fields than to the aim
of corporate law teachers for a clear doctrinal and theoretical focus. To give
an example: Bruce Welling writes in his influential casebook on Canadian
corporate law: “[S]ome are outside the scope of ‘corporate law’ as such,
having acquired a subspecialty over the years. . . . Some groups are not
recognized in general as having a role to play in the corporation’s
government.”60 In Robert Clark’s masterful book, we find a clear reminder to

57.

JOHN W. CIOFFI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM, REGULATORY POLITICS, AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE CAPITALISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 9 (Comp.
Res. in L. & Pol. Econ., Law Research Inst. Research Paper Series No. 6/2005, 2005) (“The
American corporate governance regime embodies a complementary and mutually
reinforcing relationship between the market-driven financial system and a legalistic,
transparency-based regulatory regime.”), available at
http://www.comparativeresearch.net/papers/CLPE_Vol_01_No_01_RPS_06_Cioffi.pdf.
58.

See generally Layna Mosley, Attempting Global Standards: National Governments,
International Finance, and the IMF's Data Regime, 10 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 331 (2003).
59.

See generally Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship, 63
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 456 (2004).
60.

Bruce Welling et al., Canadian Corporate Law 51 (2d ed. 2001).
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his readers to include labor law in their research on corporations and
corporate law.61 In contemporary writings, this diversity continues. In The
Anatomy of Corporate Law, which has already become a leading reference
work for the study of corporate law, the authors recognize labor law among
other “non-corporate law constraints” imposed on companies.62 Labor law,
in this description, is identified as a body of law “designed to serve
objectives that are largely unrelated to the core characteristics of the
corporate form.”63 In contrast, Simon Deakin, a British chaired corporate law
professor and world-renowned labor law scholar observes: “While labour
law and corporate governance could once have been thought as discrete areas
for analysis, it is clear that this is no longer the case. The relationship
between them has become both complex and paradoxical.”64
This divergence in approaches and perspectives continues throughout the
books written by corporate and labor law scholars, the journals they publish
in, and the conferences they attend.65 Within the academy and the law
school’s curriculum, corporate law is seen in concert with courses and issues
in securities regulation and bankruptcy law, but not with labor law. Courses

61.

ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 32 (1986) (“[E]ven if your aim is not to
understand all of law’s effects on corporate activities but only to grasp the basic legal
‘constitution’ or make-up of the modern corporation, you must, at the very least, also gain a
working knowledge of labor law.”); see also DETLEV F. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW
11 (3d ed. 1989) (regretting the omission of labor and contract law from the reach of
corporate law studies in spite of the fact that creditors and employees “may have a lasting
and intimate relationship with the corporation”). A very careful assessment of the
“dilemma” of the traditional definition of corporate law (to focus primarily on business
associations and their organizational structure) is given by FRIEDRICH KÜBLER,
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 3–4 (5th ed. 1998); a similarly cautious identification of the reach of
corporate law—droit des affaires—is given by YVES GUYON, DROIT DES AFFAIRES 1 (12th
ed. 2003).
62.

Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and
Functional Approach 17 (2004).
63.

Id.

64.

Simon Deakin, Workers, Finance and Democracy, in THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW:
LIBER AMICORUM BOB HEPPLE QC 79, 79 (Catherine Barnard et al. eds., 2004).
65.

But see, e.g., the First International Conference of the Comparative Research in Law &
Political Economy Network at Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Ontario, Can. (Oct. 20–
21, 2005), http://www.comparativeresearch.net/main.php?page=events.php.

20

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 02 NO. 02

are not taught in reciprocal exchange of notes or literature, and students
rarely take both—unless it is mandatory. We are reminded of the late Abram
Chayes’ astute observation, “The concept of Corporation has political, legal
and social dimensions beyond the economic. But the appropriate academic
disciplines remain largely unconcerned.”66
Before we widen this admittedly very narrow perspective to the
regulatory context, a few introductory remarks shall be permitted with regard
to the regulatory program of labor law.
b. Labor Law
Labor law’s overriding concern is the protection of employment and
employees. Its focus is on the employment contract, workplace safety,
working hours, and minimum wages. Subsequently, its focus is on
representation, whether on the firm level (“works councils”) or in the context
of collective bargaining. The historical and institutional memory of
representation and conflict in labor law is long, and it clearly illuminates the
painful trajectories of rights discovery, protection, and erosion through the
rise of the industrial revolution and its ramifications and successors.67 In
many accounts, labor law is today in crisis, and it remains far from clear
whether a revival is in sight.68 At the same time, labor law and workers’

66.

Abram Chayes, Introduction to JOHN P. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND OF THEIR RELATION
TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE, at i (1961).
67.

See Achim Seifert, Das Recht der Arbeit im Wandel. Paradigmen des Arbeitsvertrags in
der neueren Geschichte des deutschen Arbeitsrechts, in 5 HANNOVERSCHE SCHRIFTEN:
TRANSFORMATION DER ARBEIT 153 (Detlev Claussen et al. eds., 2003); Harry W. Arthurs,
Reinventing Labor Law for the Global Economy: The Benjamin Aaron Lecture, 22
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271 (2001); Simon Deakin, Contract of Employment: A Study
in Legal Evolution, HIST. STUD. INDUS. REL., Spring 2001, at 1.
68.

See generally Weiss, supra note 31. But see H.W. Arthurs, National Traditions in Labor
Law Scholarship: The Canadian Case, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 645 (2002). For one of
the most promising studies for future work, see generally ALAIN SUPIOT ET AL., BEYOND
EMPLOYMENT: CHANGES IN WORK AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE (English
language ed., Pamela Meadows et al. trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (1999) (originally
published in French, as AU-DELÀ DE L'EMPLOI: TRANSFORMATION DU TRAVAIL ET DEVENIR
DU DROIT DU TRAVAIL EN EUROPE: RAPPORT POUR LA COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTÉS
EUROPÉENNES, but rewritten in English to dispel “the impression that the analysis and
diagnoses it contains apply mainly to France”).
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rights are slowly becoming part of larger corporate social responsibility
agendas.69 Much of this debate is concerned with placing the corporation in a
greater social context.70 Where a wider perspective on the business
corporation is taken, labor law meets employee-ownership theories, as well
as stakeholder capitalism models.71
2. The Regulatory Context of Corporate Governance and Labor Law
a. Corporate Governance
With a view to the regulatory context in which we explore the
purportedly separate worlds of corporate governance and labor law, we seek
to trace the larger trends of ideology that shape both fields. We find global
conversations about “best standards,” universal norms, and a worldwide
convergence toward one model of corporate governance. Clearly, we are
entering endgames of Hegelian dimensions where we hear authors
proclaiming the “end of history” with regard to the defeat of communism72
or the triumph of shareholder-value capitalism.73 Central to these discussions
are national deadlocks over political conflicts resulting from path-dependent

69.

See, e.g., Wesley Cragg, Human Rights and Business Ethics: Fashioning a New Social
Contract, 27 J. BUS. ETHICS 205, 208 (2000); Andrew Gamble & Gavin Kelly, Shareholder
Value and the Stakeholder Debate in the UK, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE 110, 114 (2001);
Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111
YALE L.J. 443, 531–33 (2001). For a very critical stance, see H.J. Glasbeek, The Corporate
Social Responsibility Movement—The Latest in Maginot Lines to Save Capitalism, 11
DALHOUSIE L.J. 363, 366–67 (1988).
70.

See generally Alston, Core Labour Standards, supra note 19; Alston, Facing up, supra
note 19, at 475–77; BLANPAIN & COLUCCI, supra note 23, at 111–17; Robert O'Brien, The
Difficult Birth of a Global Labour Movement, 7 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 514 (2000).
71.

See GREGORY K. DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM: WORKERS' CONTROL IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (2003); Paul Edwards et al., New Forms of Work Organization in the Workplace:
Transformative, Exploitative, or Limited and Controlled?, in WORK AND EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS IN THE HIGH PERFORMANCE WORKPLACE 72 (Gregor Murray et al. eds., 2002);
Teresa Ghilarducci et al., Labour’s Paradoxical Interests and the Evolution of Corporate
Governance, 24 J.L. & SOC'Y 26 (1997).
72.

Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992).

73.

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 32.
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institutional structures and trajectories.74 Thus, it comes as no surprise that
the existential differences between different corporate law regimes are
regularly presented as the decisive challenge to law reform.75
Corporate law in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom is
overwhelmingly “enabling” law, with the state regulating only the
framework and leaving the rest of the internal governance regulation to the
firm’s constitutional statutes.76 In contrast, while in the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom only securities law is mandatory and
federally regulated law, we find that company law regimes in Europe are
much more regulated. For example, in Germany, most of corporate law is
mandatory, not enabling, law.77 As already suggested in the introduction,
however, the legislative framework of corporate law has ceased to be
determined by domestic policy alone. And while this has occurred for several
decades78 already, an even stronger push has taken place in the last few

74.

See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Political Foundations for Separating Ownership from Control, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES 113, 125–31 (Joseph A. McCahery et al. eds., 2002);
see generally Ronald Dore et al., Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century, OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL'Y, Winter 1999, at 102; Mark J. Roe, Commentary, Chaos and Evolution in
Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 643–44 (1996); Peer Zumbansen, European
Corporate Law and National Divergences: The Case of Takeover Regulation, 3 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 867, 881–82 (2004).
75.

See, e.g., RONALD DORE, STOCK MARKET CAPITALISM: WELFARE CAPITALISM 176–81
(2000).
76.

See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 42; Joseph A. McCahery, Introduction to THE
GOVERNANCE OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 1, 4 (Joseph A. McCahery et al.
eds., 2004) (“A recurring theme in the literature concerns the role of mandatory rules in
statutory standard forms. In contrast with the United States, the trend in European corporate
law has been to dismiss the benefits associated with the enabling approach too quickly,
relying on a narrow range of techniques and mandatory rules to balance the interests of the
various parties.”).
77.

See Theodor Baums, Corporate Governance in Germany—System and Recent
Developments, in ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 31 (Mats Isaksson & Rolf Skog
eds., 1994). But see Theodor Baums, Company Law Reform in Germany, 3 J. CORP. L.
STUD. 181, 183 (2003) (discussing the “comply or explain” principle).
78.

See Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Future of the European Company Law Scene, in THE
HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 3 (Clive M. Schmitthoff ed., 1973);
RICHARD M. BUXBAUM & KLAUS J. HOPT, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS
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years. The making of corporate law is no longer only a domestic process but
one that unfolds in a multilevel environment of legislatures providing
binding rules (e.g., the U.S. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002;79 the refining
listing rules for foreign corporations on the NYSE;80 the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Corporate Governance
Principles and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations;81 and
numerous corporate governance codes on the domestic, international, and
transnational level82) and nation-state governments either transposing such
norms or complementing them with further regulatory initiatives. This
multilevel regulatory environment is characterized by a coexistence of soft
norms generated by quasi-public expert commissions,83 hard, statutory law,
and by cross-national benchmarking84 of standards and norms. It is in this
context that the remarks by the EU Commissioner for the internal market,
Charlie McCreevy, not to invest hopes in a soon-to-come EU-wide Code of
Corporate Governance but, instead, to promote mutual learning and
benchmarking, deserve particular attention:
Europe has a role to play. That role is to co-ordinate where
possible Member States’ efforts to improve corporate
governance practices, through changes in their national
company law, securities law or in corporate governance
codes. There are different traditions in different Member
States and those should be respected, but we must avoid

ENTERPRISE: CORPORATE AND CAPITAL MARKET LAW HARMONIZATION POLICY IN EUROPE
AND THE U.S.A. 167 (1988).
79.

15 U.S.C.S. §§ 7201–7266.

80.

Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002).
81.

ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note 35; ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2000),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
82.

See generally MALLIN, supra note 26, ch. 3; European Corp. Governance Inst., Index of
All Codes, http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php.
83.

See, e.g., Baums, supra note 34.

84.

Zumbansen, supra note 27, at 38.
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unnecessary divergences which distort the single market and
make life difficult for investors. Member States want and
need to learn from each other’s experience. The Corporate
Governance Forum brings together a vast amount of highlevel experience and expertise. It has a key strategic role to
play.85
In a more recent speech, delivered on November 17, 2005, McCreevy
stressed the importance of this approach in light of the “different economic,
social and legal traditions” among the EU Member States, even if he
perceived a “market-driven trend towards convergence in Europe.”86
Not everyone, however, shares this careful and open perspective. No less
than the “end of history” for corporate law was proclaimed,87 just before the
financial scandals of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and others became public.88
The forceful and yet contested89 narrative of a worldwide turn to
shareholder-value based rules of corporate governance was brought forward
in light of the still vivid memories of the Takeover-High in the 1980s and
1990s, and the recovery of the U.S. economy and its citizens’ buying power

85.

Press Release, European Union, Corporate Governance: Commissioner McCreevy
Outlines His Views to European Forum (Jan. 20, 2005), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/78&format=PDF&aged=
1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
86.

Charlie McCreevy, European Comm’r for Internal Mkt. & Services, Future of the
Company Law Action Plan (Nov. 17, 2005) (“There is no one-size-fits-all approach in
corporate governance. The Commission should continue to encourage ‘best practices’ to
develop according to the demands of ever more integrated markets.”) , available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/702&format=HT
ML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Dec. 23, 2005).
87.

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 32.

88.

For a brilliant analysis of the Enron financial scandal, see William W. Bratton, Enron
and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002).
89.

See Branson, supra note 25; William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative
Corporate Governance and Barriers to Global Cross Reference, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REGIMES, supra note 74, at 23, 24; cf. Simon Deakin & Alan Hughes,
Comparative Corporate Governance: An Interdisciplinary Agenda, 24 J.L. & SOC'Y 1, 5
(1997) (providing examples of nations that do not have shareholder value-based models).

2006]

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LABOUR LAW

25

in a dazzlingly triumphant stock market.90 At its core, this narrative contains
a powerful endorsement of the “outsider-control” model of corporate
governance in which control is exercised through independent directors and
through the stock market’s scrutiny of management behavior through the
threat of takeovers. In contrast, the story clearly marks as the losing party the
“insider-model” of closely interconnected corporate holdings and seats on
supervisory boards for financial institutions and industrial partners.91 The
narrative has strong repercussions for the perception of the firm and, with it,
the legal apparatus that is of relevance to the firm. Its strong emphasis on
investor protection, financial transparency, and market-based control
mechanisms increasingly shifts emphasis away from modes of internal
corporate control.
1. Crisis, What Crisis?
This is a crucial development. In the debate on the negative side of the
account it leaves only generalizing umbrella terms that are employed to
identify, but not explain, the insider-control model of corporate governance.
The storyteller is thus inclined to forget certain characteristic features of the
insider-control model that would be worth pondering for a better
understanding of the process of corporate law evolution. The intimate
relationship between corporate management and directors of lending
institutions and CEOs of industrial partners in a densely woven corporate
network—while clearly inducing many of the heavily criticized petrifying
effects—clearly bears features of institutional stability and incremental
growth. Among these forgotten features, we find long-term financing and the
possibility of synergies in future-oriented research and development and
innovation among connected firms. Furthermore, we find elements of variant
forms of employee voice in the boardroom hidden under the insider-control

90.

See NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES 147–53 (2001).
91.

See W. Carl Kester, Governance, Contracting, and Investment Horizons: A Look at
Japan and Germany, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FINANCE AND
GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS: A COMPARISON OF THE U.S., JAPAN AND EUROPE 227, 240–41
(Donald H. Chew ed., 1997); Klaus J. Hopt, The German Two-Tier Board (Aufsichtsrat): A
German View on Corporate Governance, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ESSAYS AND MATERIALS, supra note 55, at 3, 12.
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terminology. Especially the latter has been declared as doomed, with regard
to the inefficiencies associated with workers’ participation in the boardroom
and from the perspective of a property-rights-related assessment of the
shareholder-value oriented firm. It seems clear from the point of view of a
shareholders-as-corporate-owners model that workers ought not to be given a
say in a corporate undertaking that is not theirs.92
This model, however, fails to conceive of the complexly structured entity
of the publicly held, large business corporation. It has long been
convincingly argued that a purely property-rights-based assessment of the
corporation cannot adequately account for the role that is played by the
corporation in society.93 From a labor law point of view and, more
particularly, from an interest-pluralism point of view, the corporation’s role
is defined by the various social interests that come together in its affairs. In
this narrative, the corporation acts as a paradoxical instrument of
domestication for powerful class conflicts. It is against this background that
we must read narratives of industrial relations, workers’ participation, and
codetermination. These stories are, however, difficult to tell in times of
economic recession and ever-more revelations of dark stains on the vest of
“Germany Inc.”94 Most importantly, the volatile availability of global capital

92.

See generally Mary O'Sullivan, The Innovative Enterprise and Corporate Governance,
24 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 393 (2000) (critiquing the shareholders-as-corporate-owners
model); Paddy Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership, 62 MOD. L.
REV. 32 (1999) (providing further critique of this model).
93.

See FRANZ KLEIN, DIE NEUEREN ENTWICKLUNGEN IN VERFASSUNG UND RECHT DER
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (1904); RATHENAU, supra note 33; BERLE, supra note 33, at 18–19;
Edward S. Mason, Introduction to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 1 (Edward S.
Mason ed., 1961).
94.

See DORE, supra note 75, at 182–206. See generally MICHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISM VS.
CAPITALISM (Paul Haviland trans., Four Wall Eight Windows 1993) (1991) (giving a very
insightful account of Germany’s particular corporate governance regime). CIOFFI, supra
note 57, at 10 (“A bank-centered financial system, networks of corporate cross-ownership,
and interlocking boards stabilized financial and ownership relations within and among firms,
freeing management to strategize for long-term growth. Strong labor unions and
codetermination incorporated labor into economic and corporate governance in ways that
further encouraged long-term planning and discouraged the pursuit of short-term financial
returns. Overarching these arrangements, institutionalized bargaining among peak
associations coordinated economic relations at the firm, sectoral, and national levels. The
German corporate governance law channeled multiple contending stakeholder interests into
largely self-regulating, long-term bargaining relationships.”).
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has induced an overwhelming pressure on corporate governance regimes
worldwide to reform their regulatory framework to accommodate the
institutional investors’ interests. In that context, anything even remotely
suspicious of protecting old-boys networks and opaque financial holdings
arouses severe critique. Washed away, however, in this great spring cleaning,
are ongoing attempts to further experiment with and build on schemes of
representation and workers’ voices in the corporation. It is no secret that the
knowledge-based corporation is vitally dependent on the information input
from its internal and external stakeholders (employees, research and
development, universities, and research centers).95 And yet, the current
dominant narrative of corporate governance reform remains more than
hesitant toward embracing more stakeholder-oriented assessments of the
firm.96 Even less do we find active endorsements of the firm as a complex
environment of societal experiment.97
Instead, current preoccupations in corporate law focus on management
discretion to adopt takeover defenses without shareholder approval,98 on

95.

See THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY: THE GROWING IMPACT OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN
SOCIAL RELATIONS (Gernot Bohme & Nico Stehr eds., 1986); BRUNO AMABLE ET AL., LES
SYSTÈMES D’INNOVATION À L’ÈRE DE LA GLOBALISATION (1997); MANAGEMENT IN EINER
WELT DER GLOBALISIERUNG UND DIVERSITÄT: EUROPÄISCHE UND NORDAMERIKANISCHE
SICHTWEISEN (Werner Auer-Rizzi et al. eds., 2002); Stefano Brusoni et al., Knowledge,
Specialization, Organizational Coupling, and the Boundaries of the Firm: Why Do Firms
Know More Than They Make?, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 597 (2001).
96.

See O’Sullivan, supra note 92.

97.

See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, “Corporate responsibility” als Problem der
Unternehmensverfassung, 12 ZGR 34 (1983); Gunther Teubner, Enterprise Corporatism:
New Industrial Policy and the ‘Essence’ of the Legal Person, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 130
(1988); PEER ZUMBANSEN, INNOVATION UND PFADABHÄNGIGKEIT. DAS RECHT DER
UNTERNEHMENSVERFASSUNG IN DER WISSENSGESELLSCHAFT [INNOVATION AND PATHDEPENDENCY: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FIRM IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY] (forthcoming
2006).
98.

See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Silja Maul &
Athanasios Kouloridas, The Takeover Bids Directive, 5 GERMAN L.J. 355 (2004),
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol05No04/PDF_Vol_05_No_04_355366_Private_Maul_Kouloridas.pdf.
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voluntary or legally mandated disclosure of management earnings,99 and on
personal liability of company leaders for false information in securities
markets.100 The financial scandals in the United States and elsewhere have
not only sharpened the public’s awareness of corporate greed but have more
powerfully refreshed the image of the corporation from a shareholder-value
point of view. The corporate governance crisis as a “crisis in confidence,”
which has been diagnosed since 2001 and has led to, among others, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of August 2002, is the crisis as seen from within the
shareholder-value paradigm. This crisis is an internal analysis of the law of
corporate governance. And yet, the programs for crisis management fail to
illuminate the fundamental complexity of regulating the firm as an
innovative social actor.
In contrast, the corporate governance crisis as it is depicted by the
erosion of employee power in corporations (German Mitbestimmung,
unionism in Europe, the EU’s Works Councils Directive,101 in North
America, the shifting weight from collective bargaining to company level,
flexibilized works council, “team production,”102 etc.103) is quite another.
From the perspective of labor law, the corporation continues to be in crisis
not (only) because of the robbery of shareholders by management but

99.

See Martin J. Conyon & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock-Based Executive Compensation, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES, supra note 74, at 625, 640–41.
100.

See Patrick S. Ryan, Understanding Director and Officers’ Liability in Germany for
Dissemination of False Information: Perspectives from an Outsider, 4 GERMAN L.J. 439
(2003), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04No05/PDF_Vol_04_No_05_439475_Private_Ryan_Complete.pdf.
101.

Council Directive 2002/18, 2002 O.J. (L 80) 29 (EC).

102.

Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in PostCapitalist Society, 24 J. CORP. L. 869 (1999).
103.

See, e.g., Paul Edwards et al., supra note 71; EUROPÄISCHE KOMMISSION, FINAL
REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS ON EUROPEAN SYSTEMS OF WORKERS INVOLVEMENT
(DAVIGNON REPORT) (1997); Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model
with Governance Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163
(Margaret Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999); Rüdiger Krause, Sarbanes-Oxley Act und
deutsche Mitbestimmung, WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN [WM] 762 (2003); John Parkinson,
Models of the Company and the Employment Relationship, 41 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 481
(2003).
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(importantly also) because of the continued division between the haves and
have-nots.104 Robert Dahl’s famous-infamous comparison between political
democracy and corporate democracy continues to haunt the perennial strive
for representation of employees within the corporation, a struggle that has
already been fought many decades ago under the heading of “shareholder
democracy” and the corporation as public actor.105
It is this undisclosed multiplication of images of the corporation and of
its crisis that leads to the continued deadlocks in the untiring debate over the
convergence of corporate governance standards.106 Crisis, what crisis? Joel
Bakan’s patient, the corporation,107 is, indeed, several patients in one. For
Bakan, it is the pathological pursuit of profit, with the crudeness of
exploitation and profit seeking, signifying the sickness of the patient. For
those lamenting the loss of confidence in the capital markets (President
Bush, declaring in the spring of 2001 the need for a yet unheard and
unspecified corporate responsibility in contrast to the much debated
corporate social responsibility), it is the need to install truly independent
directors to keep the watch over self-interested (sic!) managers. However,
another patient is the firm as painted with the brushes of labor law: the utopia
of a just society produces many angels and demons, and it remains unclear
into which category the corporation falls. But the hospital ward for labor law
patients is likely to be closed in the near future.

104.

Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
105.

See, e.g., RATHENAU, supra note 33. See Paddy Ireland, History, Critical Legal
Studies and the Mysterious Disappearance of Capitalism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 120 (2002).
106.

See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward a Single Model of
Corporate Law?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES, supra note 74, at 56; Ronald J.
Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function?, 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 329 (2001); CARSTEN BERRAR, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
IN DEUTSCHLAND IM INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH (2001); MATHIAS M. SIEMS, DIE
KONVERGENZ DER RECHTSSYSTEME IM RECHT DER AKTIONÄRE (2005).
107.

JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND
POWER (2004).
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2. Discourses on Nature are Discourses on Form and Substance
The substantive debate over the “nature of the firm”108 imperceptibly
moves into the realm of law making when we discuss the law of corporate
governance (or of labor law) in the context of the increasing proliferation of
codes of conduct. However, the debate over the genesis and validity of soft
law has been, as we will see when we turn to current developments in the
International Labour Organization (ILO) and in public international law, kept
quite distinct from the substantive debate over the corporation’s role in
society. This is surprising, as the fierce battle over the public-private nature
of codes of conduct, raised as regards their creation and enforceability, is so
obviously a mirror image of the public-private nature of the corporation
itself. But the “codes movement” is seen as a mere spin-off of a larger trend
of corporate law autonomization, weakening the tight grasp of political
regulation as firms escape the nation-state’s regulatory grip.
From the perspective of the corporation’s stakeholders, corporate
governance codes can be understood as managing (or circumventing) the
representation of employees in supervisory committees, the size of
supervisory committees, and the frequency of meetings. Expanding this
perspective, “good corporate governance,” as understood by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the OECD, consists of optimal
levels of investor protection through strict disclosure rules, effective control
mechanisms, and the mitigation or elimination of worker involvement in the
running of the company.109 Good corporate governance becomes part of a
more generally conceived measure of “good governance.” The worker who
is lost in the current paradigm of corporate governance, however, is unlikely
to be rediscovered in the “good governance” and structural adjustment
programs put forward by international financial institutions.110 It is against

108.

See generally Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).

109.

See WORLD BANK, supra note 43, at 58, 63–64; Arthurs, supra note 67, at 284–85;
KERRY RITTICH, VULNERABILITY AT WORK: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE NEW
ECONOMY: REPORT FOR THE LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA 26, 40–41 (2004), available at
http://www.lcc.gc.ca/pdf/rittich.pdf. For the context of such eroding labor rights, see
RITTICH, supra, at 9–11.
110.

See, e.g., Antony Anghie, International Financial Institutions, in THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004); KERRY RITTICH,
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this background that we need to take a closer look at the transformations that
define the current regulatory context of labor law.
b. Labor Law
Labor law’s legislative and larger regulatory program has been defined
by statutory law, case law, and soft law of both transnational and domestic
origin. As regards labor law litigation, classically, we find examples of
highly politicized adjudication, often greatly dependent on the presiding
judges of highest labor courts.111 Labor law norms and rights are shaped
through case law and statutory law, but with the persisting difficulties of
ratifying international labor law conventions by the ILO, founded in 1919,
emphasis and hope for a more effective regulation of corporate conduct
increasingly are being placed on corporate codes of conduct and on
transnational concepts such as “core labor rights.” Like the law of corporate
governance, labor law has long come under the influence of transnational
norms, the ILO conventions being among the most commonly known.
It can be said that transnational labor law evolves also where no explicit,
formal ratification of norms has taken place in the Member States. This is
owed to the fact that labor law standards and policy considerations transgress
geographical and political borders and thereby contribute to elements of what
Harry Arthurs referred to as a “Labour Law Without the State.”112 This body
or, more accurately, this web of transnational norms and standards, consists
of norms generated by international organizations, such as the ILO, and of
private norms issued by corporate actors and interest organizations.113 Labor
norms included in corporate codes of conduct raise dramatic questions as to

RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING: LAW, DISTRIBUTION AND GENDER IN MARKET
REFORM (2002).
111.

For example, in Germany, labor law’s development is regularly attributed to the
changing presidents of the Federal Labor Court.
112.
113.

Arthurs, supra note 31.

See, e.g., Corporate Codes of Conduct,
http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/code/main.htm (last visited Jan. 13,
2006).
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the scope and limits of protection that they offer.114 This coexistence and
overlapping of public and private regulation, and of norm generation among
states and private actors, illustrates what Philip Jessup coined “Transnational
Law,”115 and what others have identified as the “self-regulation of
transnational civil society.”116
With the legislative nature and quality of the ILO thus remaining a
challenge, it is worthwhile to reflect on the evolution and mandate of the
ILO. The ILO’s history of attempts to create worldwide labor rights to
protect workers had already begun by the end of the nineteenth century. In
fact, the ILO’s very creation gives strong testimony of institutional
commitment and its drive towards international cooperation. The ILO’s
subsequent dramatic history reaches a high point with the 1998 Declaration
of the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998 Declaration) that
proclaims four core principles: (1) freedom of association and effective
recognition of the right to collective bargaining, (2) protection against forced
labor, (3) elimination of child labor, and (4) freedom from discrimination.117
While the 1998 Declaration marks a long needed institutional and theoretical
reaction to the challenge presented to labor law, and its norms and
institutions through the rise of the network society and the knowledge-based
global economy,118 the 1998 Declaration marks at the same time a veritable
“constitutional moment” in international labor law.119 The 1998 Declaration
moves into bright light the long-standing challenges to the ILO’s tripartite

114.

Blackett, supra note 16; Harry Arthurs, Private Ordering and Workers’ Rights in the
Global Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation,
in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 30, at 471.
115.

PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956); see Zumbansen, supra note 47.

116.

Robé, supra note 48, at 45, 49.

117.

See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, June 18, 1998,
37 I.L.M. 1233 (1998), available at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.INDEXPAGE; Langille, supra note
19, at 415.
118.
119.

Arthurs, supra note 67.

See Francis Maupain, Revitalization Not Retreat: The Real Potential of the 1998 ILO
Declaration for the Universal Protection of Workers’ Rights, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 439, 441
(2005) (“[T]he Declaration is probably the most significant of the various normative
developments that had taken place over the last decade.”).
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structure (states, employers, unions) in terms of effective negotiation and
enforcement of its norms—which can be done only by way of ratification.
After recalling the origins and founding principles of the organization, the
1998 Declaration states:
[A]ll Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions
in question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of
membership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to
realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution,
the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the
subject of those Conventions.120
These four principles lie at the heart of the debate over the future prospects
of international labor law, but this debate touches upon the foundations of
labor law as such.121
As a consequence, the theme “Globalization and Labor Law” can be told
as two narratives: one is the story of exhaustion, the other the story of an
emerging new legal order. The story of exhaustion includes the creation of
the ILO and its long and often painful history of bringing opposing nations to
the bargaining table to sign conventions on workers’ rights, which they then
had to ratify in their domestic parliaments. While the Cold War made for
little progress in the ILO, as the command and control structure in
communist countries undermined the purpose of the ILO’s unique tripartite
structure, the ILO has been facing another challenge in recent years. With a
steady decline in union density and relevance, unions might no longer be the
adequate mouthpieces for a globally dispersed workforce. Meanwhile, the
representative void is increasingly claimed by NGOs, but the following
concerns arise: (1) the ILO fears more chaos for the already difficult
negotiations, (2) the unions fear chaotic trends of interest representation and
that NGOs will import many heterogeneous issues that are not altogether
related to labor questions, while (3) the NGOs fear to give up much of their
institutional independence and autonomy when integrated into the ILO’s
formal negotiation structure.

120.
121.

ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, supra note 117.

Alston, Core Labour Standards, supra note 19; Langille, supra note 19; Alston,
Facing up, supra note 19.
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The second law-making-related narrative begins where the institutional
story of the ILO allegedly ends, and it is here where the problem lies. Very
briefly, the ILO’s 1998 Declaration could mark a turning point for the
organization, dispelling a lingering existence of often ineffective convention
making with few concrete results or effect. Through the 1998 Declaration,
the ILO has installed a multiparty monitoring and cooperation program,
which is supposed to create a powerful new solidarity program with a
practically effective side to it: countries shall work closely together when
importing a convention into domestic law. As the agenda foresees a longterm engagement, it follows that the ILO and respective nations will work
closely together to find a solution adequate to the actual conditions in a given
country.

B. The Political Economy of Regulation
1. The Exhaustion of the State as Regulator
It is against this multilayered background that we need to reflect on the
potential directions that law making in corporate governance and labor law
might take in the future. What is particularly striking about the developments
in both fields is their parallelism regarding the transformation of the forms of
norm generation, norm dissemination, and norm enforcement. In both fields,
we see the emergence of norms that are no longer generated only by
officially recognized sources of law, but also by a multitude of domestic,
foreign, and transnational norm producers. These soft norms constitute a
radical challenge to the state-based concept of law making that began to
emerge in the nineteenth century and that Max Weber, among others,122 has
so powerfully captured as the rise of “modern law.”123 In contrast to law
originating in an official constitutional order, soft law encompasses norms
that are not attributable to an official author of statutory norms, and which do
not appear directly enforceable by recognized, traditional means for the

122.

See Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principals of the Sociology of Law 10–23 (Walter L.
Moll trans., Harv. U. Press 1936) (1929).
123.

See Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 880–92
(Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Bedminster Press 1968) (1914).
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execution and application of legal rules. Instead, the soft law of both
corporate governance and labor law (the latter being enshrined particularly in
corporate codes of conduct and in core labor standards) can be read as
reactions against incapacities on the part of the state to proceed with
adequate legislation. The proliferation of soft law in corporate governance
and in labor law thus offers examples of what anthropologists and legal
sociologists have described as “legal pluralism.”124 It consists of expert
standards, best practices, recommendations, and principles, as well as
standards, that can be seen to inform ongoing searches for “better law”
without due regard to political or geographical borders. Jill Murray, a longtime expert on the ILO and on transnational labor law, powerfully captures
this phenomenon:
There was a time when a student of labor law could expect to
be introduced to three elements of the discipline: the study of
“us,” the national labour law and institutions of the particular
country in which the course is located, the study of “them,”
comparative studies of the national laws and institutions of
other countries, and the study of the “international,” usually
confined to a consideration of the role and function of the
International Labour Organisation (ILO). . . . Of course,
beneath these comfortable divisions there was always a flow
of influence and ideas about labour regulation both between
national boundaries, and between nation states and the
international body. Although the study of comparative law
has become increasingly sophisticated, very little has been
said about these interconnections between the spheres of
“domestic” and “international” in relation to the regulation of
Labor relations. In any event, this implied clear division

124.

See Moore, supra note 47; HARRY W. ARTHURS, WITHOUT THE LAW:
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 50–
88 (1988) (describing the persistence of legal pluralism in light of the ever stronger
tendencies to centralize law through statutory law and official courts); see generally John
Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986)
(defining “legal pluralism”). For further assessments of legal pluralism, see Teubner, supra
note 47, and Oren Perez, Normative Creativity and Global Legal Pluralism: Reflections on
the Democratic Critique of Transnational Law, IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD., Summer 2003,
at 25.
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between national and international, and the identity of these
two spheres on which the distinction was based, is no longer a
central organising principle within the discipline of labor
law.125
Bob Hepple, a grand doyen of labor law, uses the term “privatising
regulation” to describe the phenomenon of fragmented labor law norm
creation.126 “The most striking feature of current attempts to build on the
attempts of TNC [transnational corporations] is fragmentation.”127 The
proliferation of norm-generating institutions and entities has received
extensive theoretical analysis in the last three decades,128 but much more
must be done to further illuminate the separate worlds of corporate
governance codes and corporate codes of conduct regarding, on the one
hand, their common origin in strained regulatory powers of domestic and
international legislators and, on the other, their apparently different political
agenda.
The emergence of this unique and yet highly fragmented and
decentralized body of norms challenges our traditional state-based
understanding of law making, and thus provides a common ground on which
to assess the emergence of privatized corporate law regimes,129 corporate
codes of conduct, and core labor rights. That these forms of soft law in both
fields cannot, however, betray their stark differences with regard to their
underlying policy agendas becomes clear when we focus on their larger
programmatic aspirations.

125.

Jill Murray, Book Review, 30 Indus. L.J. 246, 246–47 (2001) (reviewing John
Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (2000) and Regulating
International Business: Beyond Liberalization (Sol Picciotto & Ruth Mayne eds., 1999)).
126.

HEPPLE, supra note 13, at 69–87.

127.

Id. at 69.

128.

See, e.g., GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 47.

129.

Zumbansen, supra note 27.
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2. Corporate Governance Codes
Corporate governance codes produced by national expert commissions or
other large, national entities such as industry associations or corporations
often embody condensed versions of the country’s larger body of statutory
norms alongside recommendations that are intended to make corporate
management more responsible to investor interests.130 While condensed
norms are included in codes to facilitate the navigation of foreign investors
through a complex web of applicable rules, the recommendations are usually
meant to appeal to the management as regards the attainment of effective
management practices, financial transparency, and responsiveness to
shareholder interests.131 The formulation and dissemination of corporate
governance codes have dramatically increased over the past ten years, and
the reasons for this development are to be sought particularly in the increased
need for domestic corporations to attract foreign capital flows. As financial
flows became ever more volatile, flexible, and mobile, the need for an
increasingly investor-friendly regulatory environment began to be
acknowledged even where firm traditions of bank-based, long-term financing
made domestic law and policy makers take a rather skeptical or defensive
attitude.132 Certainly, the emergence of corporate governance codes, as it
speaks to the increased frequency of supervisory board meetings or, to take
another issue that today is ardently disputed, the amount and the disclosure
of management earnings,133 must be seen as potentially powerful remedies

130.

See, e.g., Baums, supra note 34 (the “inside account” by the former chair of
Germany’s first government commission to analyze the shortcomings in the existing
corporate law rules and to prepare recommendations directed at management and
shareholders).
131.

For an in-depth study of current corporate governance codes, see ZUMBANSEN, supra
note 97.
132.

See John W. Cioffi, Restructuring “Germany Inc.”: The Politics of Corporate
Governance Reform in Germany and the European Union, 24 L. & POL'Y 355 (2002);
CIOFFI, supra note 57.
133.

See generally Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of “Germany Inc. ”: The Case of
Executive Pay, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497 (2002) (discussing the Americanization of corporate
governance in Germany); Alain Alcouffe & Christiane Alcouffe, Control and Executive
Compensation in Large French Companies, 24 J.L. SOC’Y 85 (1997) (examining increases
in executive pay in French firms); LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
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against regulatory deadlocks and blockades in bargaining games on the
political floor.134 In light of long-standing lines of political confrontation
with regard to key elements of corporate governance, the inclusion of
recommendations and best practice guidelines in corporate governance codes
might prove an effective tool.135
But, there should also be no doubt as to the long-term consequences of
this form of soft law. One example shall suffice: the German corporate
governance code, prepared by a government commission of German lawyers,
bankers, and business experts, endorses separate preparatory meetings of the
shareholder representatives on the supervisory board as best practice. The
underlying justification is that important decisions should be prepared among
the shareholder representatives so as to be presented more convincingly to
the employee representatives at the official plenary meeting. The crux of the
code’s recommendation, however, must be seen in the fact that such separate
meetings have been practiced all along, despite the persistence of the
criticism that they effectively undermined the aims of workers’
codetermination in supervisory boards. With the inclusion of a
recommendation of separate preparatory meetings in the code, this practice is
effectively endorsed as an example of “good corporate governance.”
3. Corporate Codes of Conduct
In contrast, corporate codes of conduct, while escaping any
straightforward attempt at definition, regularly contain a number of ethical
standards for corporate officers’ conduct with regard to the workforce (and

PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (arguing
for increased attention to the problem of excessive executive pay); see also Conyon &
Murphy, supra note 99, at 625–46; For critiques, see William W. Bratton, The Academic
Tournament over Executive Compensation, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1557 (2005) (book review);
James McConvill, Positive Corporate Governance and Its Implications for Executive
Compensation, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1777 (2005).
134.

See MARTIN HÖPNER, EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM AND THE
GERMAN PARTY PARADOX (Max-Plank-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Discussion Paper
03/4, 2003), available at http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp03-4.pdf.
135.

For a discussion of the contribution of corporate governance codes to the (improved)
self-regulation of corporations, see ZUMBANSEN, supra note 97, ch. 3.
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usually the environment).136 They too can be seen as emerging in the absence
of tangible and effective regulation for a dramatically deregulated workplace
reality. And yet, the emergence of corporate codes of conduct is driven by an
actor, or a combination of actors, quite distinct from the one that informs the
creation of corporate governance codes. From one perspective, corporate
codes of conduct could be seen, in many ways, as the result of a unique form
of public protest in a transnational civil society. The scandalizing of human
rights abuses brought to attention by NGOs, social and political activists, or
the press has drastically reduced the distance between these events and an
increasingly disturbed public in formerly faraway places. Consumer protest,
public incrimination or the initiation of protests, strikes by labor activists,
and the branding of abusive corporate practices by various civil society
members137 seems to be the labor-law-related equivalent to the recently
described phenomenon of an emerging transnational human rights regime.138

136.

Charles Sabel, Dara O’Rourke and Archon Fung have written several papers about
corporate “codes of conduct.” Charles Sabel, Dara O’Rourke & Archon Fung, Ratcheting
Labor Standards: Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace (World
Bank, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 0011, 2000), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussionpapers/Labor-Market-DP/0011.pdf; Charles Sabel et al., Ratcheting Labor Standards: How
Open Competition Can Save Ethical Sourcing, in Visions of Ethical Sourcing: A Series of
Free Vision Papers (Raj Thametheram ed. 2001), available at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/fintimes.pdf; Charles Sabel et al., Open Labor
Standards: Toward a System of Rolling Rule Regulation of Labor Practices (discussion
paper for the Annual Meetings of the World Bank Seminar on Labor Standards on Sept. 28,
1999), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/ols.pdf. For a very insightful
discussion of this proposal, see Adelle Blackett, Codes of Corporate Conduct and the
Labour Regulatory State in Developing Countries, in Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary
Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance 121 (John J. Kirton &
Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004).
137.

Robert Wai, Countering, Branding, Dealing: Using Economic and Social Rights in
and Around the International Trade Regime, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 35, 73–76 (2003).
138.

See Craig Scott & Robert Wai, Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct
Through the Migration of Human Rights Norms: The Potential Contribution of
Transnational ‘Private’ Litigation, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM 287 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004); Zumbansen, supra note 39.
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Strikingly, however, these parallels are not yet fully realized.139
Alongside vivid attempts by international organizations such as the OECD
and the ILO to promote a more effective observance of fundamental
employee rights by corporations, corporations have produced corporate
codes of conduct that include numerous pledges and voluntary commitments
by the corporation to adhere to the self-prescribed standards.140 Their legal
quality is hard to assess—they are as yet considered nonlegal, unenforceable,
and predominantly voluntary self-imposed obligations.141 They raise
important questions as to the scope of protection they effectively offer and
the larger regulatory trend in protecting labor rights that they could be seen
to drive forward. “Private corporate codes exist because of the absence of an
enforceable internationally agreed labour regime.”142 Thus, while it can be
hoped that they attain some prominence through continued pressure from
civil society as well as from such organizations as the ILO and the OECD,
which have undertaken extensive studies of numerous corporate codes of
conduct,143 a number of fundamental problems remain. As voluntary codes
of conduct, they remain in the sole discretion of the corporation; they are
often not the product of a negotiation between employer and employees.144
Crucially, perhaps, corporate codes of conduct embrace company-level
regulation of work-related issues while often rejecting union involvement or

139.

“The international human rights movement has, until recently, paid relatively little
attention to workers’ rights.” HEPPLE, supra note 13, at 21.
140.
See, e.g., Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., The Implementation of the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the Functioning of National Contact Points
(2002), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2002doc.nsf/ (follow “Reference
Components” hyperlink; then click on the blue arrow to the left of “PAC (PUBLIC
AFFAIRS AND COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTORATE)”; then click on the blue arrow to
the left of “PAC/AFF/LMP”; then follow the “PAC/AFF/LMP(2002)10” hyperlink; and
finally click on whichever flag-patterned document icon corresponds to your preferred
language and document type).
141.

“What [most private codes] share in common is that they are voluntary written
commitments to observe certain standards in the conduct of business.” HEPPLE, supra note
13, at 73.
142.

Id. at 72.

143.

Id.

144.
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other forms of organized worker representation. As such, voluntary codes
bear the danger of cutting the ties between the worker and the outside system
of institutional safeguards.
These last observations complement the already touched upon changes in
the regulatory framework of labor law. To cite Adelle Blackett,
Contemporary initiatives for setting soft law standards for
labour must take into account the specificity of labour
regulation, at both the national and international levels.
Despite their apparent pragmatic potential to improve often
deplorable conditions, such initiatives on labour are deeply
called into question. Labour is a field once largely filled by a
dense combination of industrial relations regulatory
machinery at the domestic level, particularly in states that
espoused embedded liberalism, and a plethora of international
labour standards, meant largely to guide the creation and
strengthening of state labour regulatory power.145
The emergence of codes of conduct must thus be seen as part of what is a
much more complex phenomenon. Different attempts to define, categorize,
and qualify corporate codes of conduct can only result in highlighting all
those questions that are connected to the issues of voluntariness,
nonenforcement, minimum standards, and self-commitment. To adequately
unfold the many dimensions of the phenomenon of private law making, we
must reach beyond this straightforward, legalistic inquiry into the legal and
nonlegal nature of voluntary codes. Where we focus on soft law, core labor
rights, and the alleged privatization of the labor-law-making process, we are
bound to take a decisively negative viewpoint on the contemporary
regulatory landscape.146 The alternative perspective would be more
realistic.147 What this inquiry could lead to, eventually, would be a renewal

145.

Blackett, supra note 136, at 121.

146.

See Alston, Core Labour Standards, supra note 19, at 458; Philip Alston & James
Heenan, Shrinking the International Labor Code: An Unintended Consequence of the 1998
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work?, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 221, 224 (2004).
147.

See Langille, supra note 19, at 409–12.
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of those normative promises that informed labor law from its beginnings,
while reconstructing them in view of the changes in the regulatory
environment as they have been described. A juxtaposition of the allegedly
private vices of voluntary codes of conduct with the public virtues of an
effectively functioning, protective labor law regime can be validated only in
this regard. Where it helps to initiate renewed deliberations over the
protective scope of labor law norms, instead of condemning all forms of soft
law outright, the juxtaposition of private and public ordering could allow us
to illuminate the shortcomings and preoccupations on both sides.
4. Public Versus Private Regulation: Can Globalization Be “Fair”?
In order to further assess the regulatory environment in which we see the
emergence of corporate codes of conduct, we need to widen the perspective
still more. In February 2004, the World Commission for the Social
Dimension of Globalization issued a 190-page report, “A Fair Globalization:
Creating Opportunities for All.”148 The Commission was initiated by the ILO
in 2002 and produced a wide-ranging analysis as well as recommendations
on globalization’s much-disputed “discontents,” such as poverty, inequality,
and exclusion.149 While the report embraces highly advanced ideas of
decentralized law making and responsive regulation, some authors recognize
that risks lie in focusing on the promotion of labor standards while
decoupling this process from the existing law-making and supervisory
mechanisms in the ILO.150 Their intention to instead preserve a strong role
for the tripartite negotiation framework at the ILO could invite equal
amounts of critique and applause. The problem, however, lies elsewhere. No
adequate assessment of the regulatory models as suggested in the
Commission’s report is possible when the substantive discussion over the
need for an effective labor law regime is decoupled from the wider range of
regulatory changes that characterize the attempts to consolidate and protect

148.

WORLD COMM’N ON THE SOC. DIMENSION OF GLOBALIZATION, A FAIR
GLOBALIZATION: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL (2004), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/docs/report.pdf.
149.

SASSEN, supra note 16; JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
(2002).
150.

See generally Alston & Heenan, supra note 146.
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rights of workers in a globally integrated marketplace. Namely, seen in light
of current regulatory changes in labor law making that are defined by a
seemingly irreversible trend to company level negotiation and minimum
standards, the report’s authors went to great lengths in defining their
approach to addressing the regulatory challenge that labor law faces today.
The Commission can in fact be seen as embracing a decentralized and highly
diversified public-private policy mix. As such, the report cannot be imagined
without keeping in mind prior experiences with the United Nations Global
Compact151 and the more recent Draft Norms on Human Rights
Responsibilities for Transnational Corporations.152
When compared to developments in regulatory regimes elsewhere, we
are increasingly able to understand the similarity between the rights
protection regime in labor law and other areas of globalized law.153 We find
that problems of procedure, norm generation, and enforcement must be seen
in close connection to the substantive area in which they are developed. It is
only when these different dimensions are conflated that ideology can make
us blind to the complexity of the challenge.154 Even the most dedicated labor
lawyers express their positive (or perhaps optimistic) expectations toward the

151.

The U.N. Global Compact was initiated in 1998 by U.N. Secretary General, Kofi
Annan, to create an international initiative that would bring companies together with U.N.
agencies, labor, and civil society to support universal environmental and social principles.
See United Nations Global Compact Home Page, http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last
visited Jan. 13, 2006). For a discussion, in particular, of its voluntary, non-binding nature,
see Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to The Next Level,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 411–13 (2005).
152.

See generally Carolin F. Hillemanns, UN Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,
4 GERMAN L.J. 1065 (2003),
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04No10/PDF_Vol_04_No_10_1065-1080_Euro
pean_Hillemanns.pdf (discussing the development of guidelines for corporations with regard
to human rights and labor rights).
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For an explanation of globalization and its effect on administrative law, see Alfred C.
Aman, Jr., Administrative Law for a New Century, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 90 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997); ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT
(2004).
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(2000).
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current development in transnational labor law making.155 But, they also
point to the dramatic risks inherent in this process: without long-termoriented institution building, workers as vulnerable contract partners might
before long become subjected to market forces without any effective defense
instruments to aid them.
5. Legal Rhetoric and the Move Away from Formalism
What remains crucial is the assessment of times and places when and
where a certain legal program is being promoted and the rhetoric that is
being employed to that effect. Law making never takes place in a void.
Instead, the tension that we can perceive in the area of international labor law
between state regulation and monitoring, on the one hand, and soft law, core
labor rights, and corporate self-regulation, on the other, can be seen as
resonating with a much larger trend in contemporary international legal
thinking. As Martti Koskenniemi brilliantly argued, the current state of
theorizing in international law—in particular on the issue of humanitarian
intervention and the “war against terror”—is characterized by a “turn to
ethics” and an ironic reversal of the normal and the exception.156 We tend to
disregard the normal and to take it as given, natural, and ultimately neutral.
Only the exception challenges us, and only in mobilizing an ethical response
to the perceived horrors of the world do we proclaim universal standards and
solidarity. We intervene in other countries based on a very vaguely defined
ethical agenda and thereby forget the everyday injustice that has always been
and to the continuance of which we greatly contribute.157
One finds it hard to dissociate this observation from assessments of the
developments in international economic law, the WTO, the World Bank, and
the IMF. In both general public international law and international economic
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See Weiss, supra note 31, at 177; Arthurs, supra note 67, at 285; Langille, supra note
19, at 437.
156.

Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’: Kosovo, and the Turn to
Ethics in International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159, 160 (2002).
157.

The theme of law’s violence is, of course, a very old one and one that is inherent to
law. See Douglas Hay, Time, Inequality, and Law’s Violence, in LAW’S VIOLENCE 141, 141–
73 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992).
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law we appear to be facing erosions of formalism.158 Instead, we find policy
agendas that cover macro- and microeconomic adjustment as conditions for
funds and loans.159 This development is largely principle and policy driven,
and it functions—to a large degree—without formal rules. Almost
imperceptibly, the global marketplace begins to represent elements of a
political “New World Order.”160 But, while its protagonists aspire to the
transnational emergence of networks and civil society bodies engaging in
global deliberations,161 the new world order could elevate the struggle over
political values to an abstract level where decisions are taken over liberal and
non-liberal states, good states and rogue states. An ethical turn could
dissociate decision-making processes from any procedural critique of how
this process is composed and into which larger regimes of law creation, law
enforcement, and power distribution it is embedded.

II. THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
A. The Transnational Advantage
It is here that we need to contemplate the particular quality and role of
law in this process today. Our previous examination of the actors and
decentralized law making processes enables us to take a closer look at
current forms of multilevel and multipolar regulatory governance. As
suggested above, the norms that shape the constitution of the firm and those
that form the body of labor law for the worldwide activity of business
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RITTICH, supra note 109, at 153–69.

159.

Anghie, supra note 110, at 224. See also STIGLITZ, supra note 149, at 27–28.
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See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct.
1997, at 183, 184 (“A new world order is emerging, with less fanfare but more substance
than either the liberal internationalist or new medievalist visions. The state is not
disappearing, it is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts. These parts—
courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures—are networking with their
counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new,
transgovernmental order.”).
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corporations and their employees are transnational in nature. Although
numerous accounts of the scope and content of transnational law (TL) exist,
the following sketch shall carve out the essential ideas as they apply to our
theme of the separate worlds of corporate governance and labor law.
The first usage of the term TL continues to be disputed. While
scholarship focused on the origins of the term for a long time, it has since
become apparent that the real challenge of TL lies in its scope and
conceptual aspiration.162 Within an interdisciplinary research agenda
concerning the transformation of globalized law, TL offers itself as a
supplementing and challenging category. Famously conceptualized in a
series of lectures by Philip Jessup at Yale Law School in 1956,163 TL “breaks
the frames” (Teubner) of traditional thinking about interstate relationships by
pointing to the myriad forms of border-crossing relations among state and
non-state actors.
Jessup writes that he “shall use . . . the term ‘transnational law’ to include
all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers.
Both public and private international law are included, as are other rules
which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.”164 When examining
the inescapable “problem” of people worldwide whose lives are “affected by
rules,” Jessup points to the striking contingency by “which we attribute the
label of ‘law’ to rules, norms or customs that govern various situations.” It is
the hallmark of TL to identify the hidden agendas and the blind spots of
traditional regulatory law understandings. These are marked by clear
assignments of law-making authority to certain institutions and a clear view
of which norms of societal guidance are to be recognized as legal rules. In
contrast, TL suggests a widening of the law-making agenda and of our
understanding of law as such. TL emerges from the increasingly interlocking
spheres of societal norm production by public, official and private, unofficial
norm-setting agencies and actors.
Based on such an expanded understanding of law, TL has begun to reach
deep into the heart of contemporary struggles over the role of law within
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JESSUP, supra note 115; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB.
L. REV. 181 (1996).
163.

JESSUP, supra note 115.
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dispersed and fragmented spaces and places of norm production.165 TL
reminds us of the very fragility and unattainedness of law. At the beginning
of the twenty-first century, we are still at a loss to identify a theory of law
that would be subtle enough not to stifle emerging identities in a postcolonial era,166 while providing “forms, fora, and processes”167 for the
collision of discourses that mark post-metaphysical legal thinking.168 It is
against this background that our search continues for a legal theory that
could adequately describe the complex regulatory environment identified
earlier.
The transnational perspective on law allows us to identify the
dehierarchized law-making processes across national borders.169 Building on
Saskia Sassen’s and Sousa Santos’s work on the importance of the study of
places and spaces of regulation,170 we can begin to discern the regulatory
groundwork of globally integrated markets. Seen through a governance lens
that parallels both the emerging governance structures and discourses on the
national, transnational, and global level, the “domestic face of
globalization”171 becomes apparent, and “globalization” loses much of its
supposedly foreign, “outside” character. And it is through the realization of
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For background on the distinction between spaces and places, see SASSEN, supra note
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See, e.g., Beth Lyon, Discourse in Development: A Post-Colonial Theory “Agenda”
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169.
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similarities of legal and political struggles in other places that the shared
place between those and our struggles becomes visible. It is against this
background that the study of corporate codes of conduct may alert us to the
challenges of empowering workers in fragmented workplace realities that
have been moved out of the reach of national regimes of labor law
protection.
The task, therefore, is to create a transnational regulatory
framework which encourages and develops the potential of
TNCs to raise the labour standards of economically and
socially disadvantaged groups of workers and producers,
particularly in the informal sector. At national level, the
application and elaboration of this framework has to take
account of the specific local cultural, social and economic
features. We must, therefore, evaluate the emerging methods
of transnational labour regulation according to their potential
for the dissemination of “best practices” and for developing
solidarity between workers employed by TNCs in different
countries.172
TL thus illuminates the parallels between fragmented regulatory
developments that no longer follow only the rules of state-based, statutory
law making and enforcement through courts. At the same time, the
transnational law of codes of conduct recalls the regulatory experiences
within a specific, national regulatory environment, which regularly consists
of contested strands of law, culture, and socioeconomic struggles.173 In this
vein, TL contains the narratives of law’s past as it is embedded in national
histories of law as an instrument of social change.174 TL, then, can be seen as
always aspiring to form a stable body of law, while it constantly unfolds as a
regulatory experiment in a multipolar and multilevel socioeconomic
environment. In that respect, the study of TL can sharpen our perception
against the creation of allegedly “new rights,” values, and principles that are
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being presented as something different from the regulatory rules and statutes
that legal theory has been concerned with all along.
TL offers itself as a critique of the promises of private ordering
increasingly detached from processes of legitimation and political
accountability. From this perspective, the transnational law of labor law
rights is in its infancy.175 For the time being, corporate codes of conduct
appear to move forward at best a reductionist and complementary concept of
labor law, where workers’ rights are subjected to a wider corporate agenda of
social responsibility instead of being developed within an effective
regulatory framework of labor law. Meanwhile, in avoiding effective
political regulation through national governments or international bodies,
corporate codes of conduct remain regulatory instruments not in the hands of
those they are purportedly meant to protect but in the hands of their
corporate authors alone.
While the localized regulation of corporate activity echoes earlier hopes
of the advantages of decentralized governance in a wider system of
regulatory competition,176 corporate codes of conduct will not enable
workers to develop a sustainable regime of protected rights if they are not
embedded in a sensitive and adequately responsive system of monitoring and
revision. It is here where the spatial concept of public fora, organized in the
vicinity of localized corporate activity, allows us to see the connections
between different awareness initiatives by consumer groups, political
activists, lobbying groups, and non-governmental organizations.177 From a
methodological point of view, an effective supervision and control of code
production and of the rights they endorse will require continuous monitoring
efforts. Proposals such as a “rolling rule regulation,” by Sabel, O’Rourke,
and Fung address the regulatory challenge that follows from a highly
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See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
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dynamic and asymmetrically structured law-making process.178 At the same
time, we need to assess the regulatory potential of such proposals in light of
the aforementioned importance of integrating prior regulatory experiences
and struggles over democratic governance into our contemporary design of a
regulatory framework for labor law.
In the light of these challenges of decentralized and fragmented public
fora, the political imagination undergoes dramatic adaptations.
Consequently, the form and substance of the political process need to be
reconsidered in light of dramatically increased problems of representation
and identity issues.179 These must be seen as both the burden and the heritage
of the “global bukowina.”180 No “law without the state” ought to be
developed in a state of amnesia as regards the underlying and continuing
distributive issues with which labor law has always been concerned.181
Accordingly, TL can help us recognize and assess pervasive discourses of
legitimacy of the new world order in different fields of law. For example, in
the law of corporate governance, we see that the current assertion of a
globalized convergence to shareholder-value thinking tends to overlook
many existing differences, even within different trajectories of capitalism.182
The differentiated picture that has been sketched in this paper owes much
to the “Varieties of Capitalism” school, which has been casting a wider
perspective on legal and socioeconomic institutions in order to better
understand the trajectories of institutional change in the political economy of
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states.183 With regard to labor laws, this perspective allows us a richer
understanding of the regulatory environment: “[labor] laws are but one
element of a wider political economy that includes industrial relations,
corporate governance, vocational education and training, and inter-firm
relations.”184 And yet corporate governance, as it permeates the
contemporary world of corporate self-regulation, is entirely informed by a
global focus on investor protection: the definition of the business
corporation, as much as the applicable laws, remains confined to a very
narrow concept and understanding of corporate governance without
accounting for the larger political economy in which both are embedded. It is
here where new comparative research has taken its cue from the “Varieties of
Capitalism” school while taking into account the “degree of recent political
economic change that has occurred in recent years and the intensely political
processes that construct corporate governance regimes.”185
The decoupling of corporate self-regulation and the ensuing privatization
of labor law norm-setting standards seems to seriously frustrate any hopes of
improving the ailing situation of labor law regulation.186 In light of the larger
trend toward deformalization in public international law, a (admittedly very)
pessimistic reading would qualify any strengthening of labor rights and of
workers’ participation in corporate governance as an exception to the norm,
as something to be ethically considered, if at all. Workers’ rights would
increasingly be seen as excluded from the “normal” realm of labor law on
the one side and from the reach of corporate law on the other. Finally, as
workers’ rights become part of the voluntary ethics codes of a corporation,
there is the risk they fall outside the reach of a more effectively enforceable
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regulation. In contrast, a more optimistic reading that would focus on the
potential of a continuing supervision by transnational civil society actors
faces the above-described challenges of providing for effectively linked,
transnational monitoring and supervising instruments.
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B. Transnational Law and Constitutionalization
“Law is important—but cannot be all there is,
and it does not operate only in one way.”187

Some distance from the crystal palaces of transnational legal theory,
survival battles over the resistance of labor laws to neoliberal agendas of
economic globalization are being waged, and these battles serve as a constant
reminder of how much depends on their outcome. In an angry article
addressing the World Commission Report of February 2004 on the “Social
Dimensions of Globalization,” Philip Alston and James Heenan discerned an
emerging trend in constitutional thinking, which denies regulatory
intervention.188 It comes as no surprise that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Lochner v. New York189 in 1905 serves as the case in point here,
although notably and regrettably not Holmes’s dissent. While American
politics and jurisprudence did in many ways take a critical stance towards
Lochner in subsequent years,190 this reversal seems to be forthcoming.
Alston and Heenan fear that, in the wave of antiregulatory politics and
nurtured by an ideologically self-righteous neoliberal agenda, the Lochner
Court might now be seen to have promoted better “economic theory” when it
interpreted the due process clause as endorsing the principle of freedom of
contract, something that Holmes so powerfully deconstructed in his dissent.
All is in the present, and the past is forgotten. With it, all the lessons of the
past seem to be forgotten as well; the lessons from Holmes’s dissent have
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powerfully and rightly been drawn, for example, by the American realists191
but also by current work in law and development.192
In recalling the way in which Holmes deciphered the Court’s embrace of
abstract principles and its deduced legal rules from abstract principles, we
can return to the wonderful story told by Felix Cohen about Rudolf von
Jhering’s dream of being in a heaven of abstract notions.193 In his dissent,
Justice Holmes convincingly pointed out that nothing can be seen as either
being entailed or excluded by way of concrete outcomes from the
recognition of rights in the abstract form. Rights, as such, are not a guarantee
of either legal or social transformation: it is only at the level of practice,
typically in the context of a specific dispute, that their uses are determined.194
The core of the debate over corporate codes of conduct must be
discovered in the underlying understanding of the law. This core is
explosive, as it can again be split. On the one hand, we find formalism, a
discourse on “rights” and on law as assigned power. On the other hand, we
find the embeddedness of law. Here, we find law as embedded in the greater
political economy of its last battle against a globalized corporate Moloch.
But these distinctions betray their own impossibility as well as their
ideological motivation. Certainly, then, we find excitement and unrest on
both sides: Brian Langille, himself a long-standing expert on international
labor law and the ILO, rejects Alston’s lament that core labor rights
undermine the formerly endeared promise of global labor rights195 as
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promoted by the ILO as “romanticism” and “hallucination.”196 Laws exist,
Langille posits, “not as ends in themselves but for the welfare of society.”197
True, but what does that mean? Langille’s argument, while being presented
as forcefully as the one he opposes, proceeds indirectly, making passes
through neighboring territory to show that one needs to take a wider view on
things. The procession of the argument is simple, straightforward, and, at the
same time, very sophisticated. It is, indeed, both authors’—Alston’s and
Langille’s—approach to the issue that will likely make this dispute one that
will retain currency in the discussion over the ILO and the nature of the
international labor law regime in the years to come—not to mention its value
for a legal theory seminar on legal argumentation.
Countering Alston’s concern about the ILO losing its influential position
in the shaping of an international labor law regime, Langille smartly
responds, “I have never heard anyone, inside the ILO or out, claim that the
ILO was at centre stage in any meaningful sense.”198 In this part of the
argument we can recognize the operation of elements of space.199 For Alston,
the ILO’s loss of its important position in the space of labor law regulation is
ascribed to its embrace of neo-liberally induced core labor rights that will,
according to Alston, replace an allegedly more effective system of rights
protection under the auspices of the ILO in Geneva.200 Langille continues to
operate in spatial imagery in order to identify Alston’s very premise as false.
Rejecting the ILO’s occupation of a central regulatory place and, instead,
situating the ILO at the margins of global market regulation, Langille
prepares the ground for his substantively more positive assessment of the
ILO’s core labor rights program. Langille situates the ILO at some hard spot
in the complex regulatory, multilevel environment of international labor law
in order to further illuminate the regulatory challenge that the ILO faces.
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The idea that there is a centre stage and that it is located in
Geneva is probably a bad idea to start with. The international
labor law regime is probably, and probably always was, much
better regarded as a very complex motley of actors, sites of
contest, modes of action, at different levels, etc., probably
without a single centre and shifting overtime.201
In his reply, Alston sticks to the space and centrality perspective to reflect on
the importance of the ILO in shaping the international labor law regime—
from Geneva into the world through its manifold communications to national
labor law regulators.202
From within the critique of the space imagery employed by Alston,
Langille moves to the legal core of the dispute over core labor rights. Where
Alston suspects that the ILO—through its 1998 Declaration—conducted a
shift from rights to principles, Langille interprets the ILO’s embrace of
principles (“freedoms”) in its Declaration as a clear sign for just the opposite
movement, reading this as “a shift from international labor standards to
international labour/human rights.”203 Alston replies that the ILO and
existing labor law retain enough rights and that “a wide range of corporate
and other actors need to be mobilized in that endeavor.”204 To this, Langille
responds that, in fact, the ILO’s embrace of standards and core labor rights is
not only in line with the ILO’s traditional mode of norm setting, but that the
1998 Declaration can also be seen as faring more successfully in the overall
implementation programs through Member States.205 “The fact is that the
techniques at the ILO were and are soft.”206 With conventions now
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encompassing standards over long and detailed lists of rights to be ratified,
the result is that the newer conventions get overwhelmingly ratified.207
In order to identify the problem posed by those suspicious that the
introduction of human rights standards in the international labor law regime
represents merely an inside attack on the labor law regime, Langille builds
on208 the “‘capability’ theory” that Amartya Sen had developed in his book
Development as Freedom.209 Applying Sen’s approaches, Langille
contemplates shifting the perspective in legal regulation: “Promotion is not a
bad substitute for ‘enforcement’.”210 The intriguing thrust of Langille’s
argument of promoting human freedom is that the introduction of labor
standards might help countries to reflect on what their real interest is in
protecting and promoting human freedom. And it is this task that others will
hold them accountable for.211 When confronted, it turns out that both sides
share more than was visible at first. Alston points out that the core of the
international human rights regime is not, and has never been, about
“enforcement.”212 Instead, the main thrust of international human rights is
about “empowerment and mobilization.”213 With regard to the ILO, this
points in the direction of further institutional and procedural reform,
allowing the Organization to become more responsive and susceptible to
“new actors including corporations and those promulgating codes of
conduct.”214

207.

Id. at 425.

208.

Id. at 432.

209.

AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). In his groundbreaking work,
Amartya Sen famously argued for an approach in development policy that emphasizes the
growth and development of human capabilities to lead their lives according to their own
disposition. While public policy would have to target such development, it should at the
same time be influenced and shaped by participatory input from those engaged in the
developmental process. Id. at 18–20.
210.

Langille, supra note 19, at 434.

211.

Id. at 436.

212.

Alston, Facing up, supra note 19, at 479.

213.

Id. at 473.

214.

Id. at 479.

58

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 02 NO. 02

This multilevel and multipolar regulatory environment forms the
framework in which we can observe the emergence of overlapping legal
discourses such as labor law and human rights, hard and soft law, or labor
law and corporate governance. Shining through these discourses we may
hope to find traces of constitutional law with regard to determination of a
new legitimacy basis for the dramatic developments in regulatory
governance. Constitutions easily become fetishes, concepts of silencing, or
overwhelming authority, as they embody values and principles in a highly
abstract manner. It is this tension, which informs the contemporary
assessments of constitutionalization of TL.215 But, can we dismiss any
thought of constitutional thinking when we are asked to reevaluate the
boundaries of private laws with a public function?216
It is one of the great legacies of the early beginnings of American legal
realism to have argued that the dissociation of abstract principles from their
real-life application reifies the former while providing no satisfactory
explanation for the latter. The isolation of constitutional values from their
practice (Holmes) leads us to forget (1) the institutional framework in which
the constitution has been interpreted and functioning all along, and (2) the
distributive effects of the legal and socioeconomic environment in which the
constitution, or, for that matter, any other statute or norm has been
interpreted. This means for core labor standards that they too are not
different from regulation; they are just another form of regulation, and they
have to be analyzed with the same analytical framework that we hold as
adequate elsewhere.
Where self-regulation has the effect of placing workers at the mercy of
management without the availability of institutional safeguards, this form of
private ordering remains deficient. It is then not through the revival of
traditional forms of collective bargaining, as were available in the post-war
labor law regimes, but through new modes of interest representation,
monitoring, and the securing of transparency that first steps towards the
reestablishment of workers’ voice and participation may be taken. But, even
while much seems to suggest that we must turn our attention to the viable
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role that can be played by a wider circle of interest groups, the break with
prior existing forms of collective bargaining again becomes painfully
evident. Indeed, where self-regulating multinational corporations and their
codes of conduct can be seen to render the loss of entitlement and
participation rights invisible, corporate codes of conduct will remain
unsatisfactory instruments of workers’ empowerment.
Placing an abstract idea of market self-regulation in opposition to the
idea of state intervention makes either of these nonsensical. Furthermore, it
assumes they are something different. Yet, the market itself is not
unregulated.217 Instead, the market produces distributions of outcomes and
power through the actors and norms operating in it. The appeal of corporate
social responsibility and of labor norms incorporated in corporate codes of
conduct can be seen in the fact that they are commonly assumed to be neutral
and “nonregulatory.” By allegedly being mere principles instead of
conflictual rights, they are not seen as impeding on the otherwise performed
discretion of a market regulator.
Against this background, how can we describe an alternative vision of
constitutionalizing the TL of corporate governance and of labor laws?
Attaining a more effective protection of workers’ rights would take a
courageous and yet careful approach to multilevel, decentralized, and mixed
public and private governance. Its approach would have to be courageous in
its embrace of the exhaustion of traditional nation-state based or—on the
international level—state-based regulatory institutional approaches in favor
of context-sensitive models of reflexive law and responsive regulation. At
the same time, it would need to be careful in remaining aware of the
preceding and continuing political and social struggles over participation,
representation, entitlement, voice and exit, and, eventually, loyalty.218 It
would, furthermore, have to be careful and sensitive of the continuing
challenge in translating constitutional visions developed in a different
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regulatory and socioeconomic environment onto the transnational level.219
This sensitivity would have to allow for awareness of the continuing tension
between the daily, awfully quiet and routine practice of law and its
increasing moments of crisis, emergency, and exception. The development of
a constitutional dimension of TL would then perhaps allow us to remember
that at the outset of a decision for or against a regulatory option, there is
always a normative dilemma.220 That dilemma still exists regardless of which
regulatory approach is resolved upon in the end. The undeniable dilemma—a
dilemma that lies at the heart of the debate over core labor rights and
corporate codes of conduct, the “Trade and . . .” discussions, the struggle
over the rule of law projects of the World Bank, the policy recommendations
by the IMF, and also of the worldwide discussion over the alleged
convergence of corporate governance systems towards a shareholder-valueoriented model all involve many questions. These questions include: whether
and which role workers are to play in the constitution of the firm; whether
workers’ financial, safety and organizational rights must be seen in
connection with the promotion of trade policy; whether financial stability as
a policy requirement for international financial aid is meant to include
respect for a country’s political choices for or against a strong welfare
system; or whether financial stability can only be achieved through politics
of privatization and deregulation.
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